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THE TIMES THEY ARE NOT A-CHANGIN'; REFORMING THE 
CHARITABLE SPLIT-INTEREST RULES (AGAIN) 
WENDY C. GERZOO* 
The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to charitable or other purposes 
is based upon the theory that the Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its 
relief from the financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations 
from public funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of the general welfare. I 
At the end of the 1960' s there was a fever for tax refonn in the area of 
charitable giving. The treasury laid out specific areas of abuse where tax-
payers were benefiting to an extent unnecessary to encourage charitable 
donations.2 Convinced that most of those changes were desirable, Congress 
enacted legislation3 to produce more tax equity.4 During this process, 
voices were raised to moderate those measures to achieve more flexibility.5 
* Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law. I would like to thank the ACTEC Founda-
tion for funding the Symposium: The Law of Philanthropy in the Twenty-First Century at the Chicago-
Kent College of Law, Oct. 23, 2009. I would also like to thank David A. Brennen, Dean and W.T. 
Lafferty Professor of Law, for his very helpful comments on my article. 
\. H. R. REp. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., on The Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-55452 
Stat. 447, cited in J.S. Seidman, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 
LAWS: 1938-1861 17, col. I. See also Thomas B. Petska, Charitable Trusts: An IRS Examination of 
Nonexempt Philanthropic Organizations 254 (1983), available at 
http://www.amstat.org/sections/snns/Proceedings/papers/1983 _04 7 .pdf. 
2. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS: JOINT 
PUBLICATION COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND 
COMMITTEE ON FINANCE OF THE U.S. SENATE, as reprinted in 2 TAX MANAGEMENT-PRIMARY 
SOURCES (BNA) I, at § 170.31 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1969 TREASURY STUDIES AND PROPOSALS]; 
STAFF OF THE S. COMM. ON FIN., SUMMARY OF TREASURY DEPARTMENT TAX REFORM STUDIES AND 
PROPOSALS 6-7 (1969), available at http://bulk.resource.org/gao.gov/91-172/000062E2. pdf [hereinafter 
cited as SENATE SUMMARY OF TREASURY PROPOSALS]. 
3. Tax Refonn Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201, 83 Stat. 487, 526, 549 (1969). 
4. S. REp. No. 91-552, at 92 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2122 ("The commit-
tee agrees with the House that this double benefit is an unwarranted tax advantage which is not a 
necessary inducement to charitable giving." (emphasis added». 
5. Press Releases, Actions in Executive Sessions, S. Finance Comm. Decisions-Compilation, 
14, as reprinted in 2 TAX MANAGEMENT-PRIMARY SOURCES (BNA) I, at § 170.63 [hereinafter cited 
as Finance Comm. Press Release] stating: 
The [Senate] Committee, in general, accepted this provision of the House bill but adopted a 
series of modifications of the provision to provide persons with greater flexibility in making 
this type of gift and to reduce the potential adverse effect of the provision on established 
forms of giving, while at the same time protecting against the abuses to which the provision is 
directed. 
Id. House Action Summary, 37, as reprinted in 2 TAX MANAGEMENT-PRIMARY SOURCES (BNA) I, at 
§ 170.58 [hereinafter cited as 1969 House Action] ("Arguments Against.- . .. (2) The limitations 
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Also, there were those who believed that the stringencies of this legislation 
would inhibit charitable giving6 so that charities would become dependent 
upon the goodwill of the government for their continued existence.7 Some 
considered the reforms unnecessary.8 Many of the arguments made in 1969 
continue to be made today.9 
restrict the flexibility presently available to persons who wish to make gifts to charity in the form of a 
remainder interest in trust. This smaller degree of flexibility might lead to an undue curtailment of this 
type of charitable gift."); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 91sT CONG., 
GENERAL EXPLANA nON OF THE TAX REFORM OF 1969 84 (Comm. Print 1970): 
Id. 
Explanation ofprovision.-For the reasons discussed above, the Act provides limitations (for 
income tax, gift tax, and estate tax purposes) on the allowance of a charitable contributions 
deduction for a charitable gift of a remainder interest. In general, a deduction is allowed for a 
charitable gift of a remainder interest in trust, where there is a non-charitable income benefi-
ciary, if the trust is either a charitable remainder annuity trust or a charitable remainder uni-
trust. These general limitations are provided so the amount received by the charity will be 
consistent with the charitable deduction allowed to the donor on creation of the trust. This re-
sult occurs under these two limitations because they remove the flexibility of the prior provi-
sions whereby it was possible to favor the income beneficiary over the remainder beneficiary 
by means of manipulating the trust's investments. Under the new requirements, the amount 
received each year by the income beneficiary, generally, will have to be either a stated dollar 
amount or a fixed percentage of the value of the trust property. 
6. It is unclear how much taxes influence charitable donations. In 1969, Treasury acknowledged: 
In addition to the economic motivations for charitable giving, the American Association of 
Fund-Raising Counsel recognizes many non-economic incentives for giving. These include 
responses to social awareness, generosity, social pressure, pity, and habit. To the extent that 
the noneconomic factors influence charitable giving patterns, changes in the tax treatment of 
charitable donations have little repercussion on the level of contributions. 
Since these noneconomic motivations are largely nonquantifiable, the importance of the eco-
nomic incentive is difficult to distinguish from that of the noneconomic incentive. There is 
reason to believe, however, that noneconomic motivations have considerable influence on the 
level of giving. This is substantiated by the fact that studies relating variations in charitable 
contributions to changes in both the tax treatment and the incomes of contributors have been 
successful in explaining scarcely half of the observed variation in contributions. 
1969 TREASURY STUDIES AND PROPOSALS, supra note 2, at 198, as reprinted at § 170.39. 
7. H. R. REp. No. 91-413, pt. I, at 218 (1969) as reprinted in 2 TAX MANAGEMENT-PRIMARY 
SOURCES (BNA) I, at § 170.S1(Separate Views of Hon. James B. Utt on H.R. 13270) reprinted in 1969 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 164S, 1873 ("The committee's action in connection with charitable gifts may have an 
adverse impact on private philanthropy .... The committee's bill may result in many activities that are 
now reserved to our private sector becoming the responsibility of Government and may also increase 
the dependence of our universities on the Federal Government. These results would not be healthy for 
our free-enterprise system."); id. at 22S, as reprinted at § 170.S2, reprinted in 1969 U .S.C.C.A.N. at 
1880 (Supplementary Views of Hon. George Bush and Hon. Rogers C.B. Morton) ("We are unques-
tionably eliminating some tax inequities. But in doing so, we are forcing private charities and all educa-
tional institutions to turn more to the Federal Government."); House Action Summary, at 37, 39, as 
reprinted in 2 TAX MANAGEMENT-PRIMARY SOURCES (BNA) I, at §§ 170.S8-S9 ("Arguments 
Against . .. (2)The limitations restrict the flexibility presently available to persons who wish to make 
gifts to charity in the form of a remainder interest in trust. This smaller degree of flexibility might lead 
to an undue curtailment of this type of charitable gift."). 
8. 2 TAX MANAGEMENT-PRIMARY SOURCES (BNA) I at §§ 170.S8-S9("Arguments 
Against .. . (1) This provision is not necessary because local laws which impose heavy responsibilities 
upon trustees and fiduciaries serve as sufficient assurance that trusts will be handled properly."). 
9. See, e.g., Martin Feldstein, A Deduction From Charity, WASH. POST A IS (Mar. 2S, 2009): 
President Obama's proposal to limit the tax deductibility of charitable contributions would ef-
fectively transfer more than $7 billion a year from the nation's charitable institutions to the 
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As the legislation proceeded through its customary course towards 
passage, those reforms naturally underwent certain modifications. One 
change, however, that did not seem deliberate is the definition of charitable 
split-interest I 0 that appears in the statute. That definition is broader than the 
definition originally appearing in the Treasury proposals, House and Senate 
Reports, and in the stated rationale for the charitable split-interest trust 
reforms. I I The 1969 legislation was aimed at correcting abuses inherent in 
using the actuarial tables to value present and future interests in the same 
property; 12 however, during the reform process the original language and 
definition of a charitable split-interest in trust expanded to apply to prop-
erty interests that do not involve the potential for valuation manipulation 
that was characteristic of actuarial valuation because they do not require the 
use of the actuarial tables to determine their value. While generally correc-
tive of problems inherent in actuarially determined valuation, the plain 
language of the statute as enacted denies a charitable deduction to the tax-
payer in circumstances that do not have any abuse potential.!3 Indeed, some 
charitable split-interest trusts do not qualify for any deduction despite the 
fact that the donor's tax benefit, if allowed, would equal the benefit to the 
federal government. But the high-income taxpayers affected by the rule change are likely to 
cut their charitable giving by as much as the increase in their tax bills, which would, ironi-
cally, leave their remaining income and personal consumption unchanged. 
Id.; Robert Frank, Why the Obama Tax Hikes Won't Kill Charity, WALL ST. 1. Blogs (Mar. 4, 2009), 
available at http://blogs.wsj.comlwealthl2009/03/04/why-the-obama-tax-hikes-wont-kill-charity/, 
stating: 
As I wrote last week, charities are up in arms over President Obama's proposal to trim the de-
ductions that the rich take on charitable donations. Some alarmists say charity as we know it 
will be dead. The reality may be less alarming. A philanthropy study out today from Bank of 
America shows that the majority oftoday's wealthy and affiuent donors wouldn't stop their 
giving even if deductions were wiped out entirely. (BofA and the Center on Philanthropy at 
Indiana University polled 700 households with net worths of at least $1 million and incomes 
of $200,000, which now counts as 'Obama rich.') ... So only 10% of the rich would cut off 
their contributions-and that is only if deductions went to zero. President Obama is proposing 
to reduce the deduction for top-income households to 28% from 35%. 
Included among the 1969 reforms proposed by Treasury, but not adopted by Congress, was a three 
percent floor on charitable deductions. See SENATE SUMMARY OF TREASURY PROPOSALS, supra note 2, 
at 6 ("The report believes that this would reduce significantly the number of returns requiring audit but 
would maintain tax incentive for more than routine gifts to charity."). 
10. This article will focus on charitable split-interests in trust. The Tax Code also provides a 
charitable deduction for a remainder interest in a personal residence or a farm, see Treas, Reg. 
§20.2055-2(e)(2)(ii) (as amended in 2003), and a charitable deduction or exclusion for qualified conser-
vation easements. See I.R.C. §§ 170(h), 2031(c), 2055(f), 2522(d) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14 (as 
amended in 1999). 
II. See supra notes 2, 4-7. 
12. 1969 TREASURY STUDIES AND PROPOSALS, supra note 2, at 38, as reprinted at § 170.32. 
13. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201, 83 Stat. 487, 526, 549 (1969). 
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charity.14 The plain language of the statutory definition of a charitable 
split-interest trust has consequently engendered its own inequities. 15 
Moreover, when Congress focused on curtailing the abuses related to 
charitable split-interest trusts in its 1969 tax reforms, it did not anticipate 
that it was creating new tax loopholes. By permitting a net income charita-
ble remainder unitrust ("NICRUT") or a net income charitable remainder 
unitrust with a makeup provision ("NIMCRUT"), Congress has allowed 
donors to defer the taxation of income with a much greater flexibility than 
the Tax Code currently provides. 16 Likewise, by creating the charitable 
lead trust ("CL T"), Congress fashioned a device-currently popular with 
the very wealthy-that invites abuses of the very same nature that Congress 
had sought to correct in its 1969 tax reforms. 17 As promoted by charities 
and estate planners, a donor can establish a CLT and thereby transfer much 
of his wealth to his family for comparatively little cost in terms of estate or 
gift taxes. Therefore, the charitable split-interest rules need to be re-infused 
with the spirit of 1969 and further revised to serve tax equity. 
This article will review the history of the tax treatment of charitable 
split-interest gifts, emphasizing the policy rationale behind the seminal 
1969 legislation, identify the inequities that Congress generated by the 
1969 legislation, and propose further reforms to protect the charity, the 
donor, and the United States Treasury. 
1. THE 1969 TAX REFORM ACT 
The 1969 Tax Reform Act made major changes to the area of charita-
ble donation deductions. These reforms affected the income, gift, and estate 
tax consequences for making certain types of charitable gifts. The modifi-
cations included the maximum income tax deduction value for a gift of 
appreciated property to a charity,18 new maximum percentage limitations 
for a current year income tax charitable deduction,19 the bargain sale to 
14. See id. at § 201, 83 Stat. at 553-54. 
15. See infra Part 1I.c. 
16. See Ron Shoemaker & David Jones, K. Charitable Remainder Trusts: The Income Defe"al 
Abuse and Other Issues, at 140 (1997), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/topic-k.pdf. 
17. See infra Part III.C. 
18. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201 (e)(I)(8), 83 Stat. 487, 555-556 (1969) (reducing the fair market value of the donation by any amount of gain that would not have resulting in 
longer term capital gain in a sale and, reducing by fifty percent of the long term capital gain (62.5 
percent for a corporation) (I) the fair market value of a donation of tangible personal property if its use 
is not related to the charity's exempt purpose or (2) in the instance of a donation for a private founda-
tion.) See I.R.C. § 170(e)(I) (2006). 
19. Tax Reform Act of 1969, 83 Stat. at 550-553 (codified as I.R.C. § 170(b» (including an 
overall limitation for an individual's aggregate charitable deduction to no more than fifty percent of his 
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charity required basis adjustments,20 and the availability of an income tax 
deduction for a contribution to a charitable remainder trust (CRT).21 More 
pertinent here, however, the amendments produced required forms for de-
ductible split-interest gifts to charities.22 The 1969 changes to the charitable 
split-interest rules were primarily motivated by the then-current abuses 
where the taxpayer's donation financially benefited the taxpayer more than 
the charity.23 
A. The 1969 Charitable Split-Interest Rules 
Beginning in 1970, if a donor makes a split interest gift in trust to a 
charity, she is entitled to a charitable deduction only if she makes that gift 
in a specific statutory form: a CRT, a CLT, or a pooled income fund. 24 A 
CRT must be created either as a charitable remainder annuity trust (CRA T) 
or a charitable remainder unitrust (CRUT).25 A CLT must be in the form of 
either a charitable lead annuity trust (CLA T) or a charitable lead unitrust 
(CLUT).26 While the income interest of either a CRUT or a CRA T may be 
subject to a qualified contingency, the value of that interest will be com-
or her contribution base, which is defined as a taxpayer's adjusted gross income without regard to any 
section 172 net operating loss carryback.) See also I.R.C. §§ 170(b)(I)(A) & 170(b)(I)(F). The reforms 
also included the repeal, with a five year phase-out, of a 100 percent charitable deduction allowed in 
some instances. Tax Reform Act of 1969, supra note 3, at § 201 (a) and (h) (enacting I.R.C. 
§§ 170(b)(I)(C), (f)(6) & (g)). See 115 CONGo REc. 22,805 (Aug. 7, I 969)(statement of Rep. Randall): 
!d. 
The original unlimited charitable contribution deduction [for income taxes] goes back to the 
case of the Philadelphia nun who, as one of the Drexel heirs in 1927, was sworn to poverty. 
Her case was responsible for legislation which was the beginning of rule allowing unlimited 
charitable deductions .... We do not impugn the good intentions of contributors but at the 
same time this worst of all loopholes should be eliminated because of the privilege to give 
away at the appreciated value rather than its original or low cost basis and then utilize this as 
an unlimited deduction against other income, all under the shelter of giving to charitable 
causes. 
20. Tax Reform Act of 1969, supra note 3, at § 201 (a)(codified as I.R.C. §§ 170 (e) & 1011 (b)). 
21. Id. (disallowing a deduction, other than for a remainder interest, for property in trust unless the 
trust is an annuity or unitrust and unless the grantor is taxed as the owner under the grantor trust rules). 
See also I.R.C. § 170(f)(2). 
22. Tax Reform Act of 1969, supra note 3, at §§ 201 (a)(I)(8), (b), (d)(I), & (e)(I), 83 Stat. 556-
557,559-564 (amending I.R.C. §§ 170(f), 642(c), 664, 2055(e), & 2522(c)). 
23. See supra Part I.B. 
24. I.R.C. §§ 170(f)(2)(A), 170(f)(2)(B), 170(f)(3), 2055(e)(2), 2522(c)(2). This article focuses on 
issues regarding CRTs and CLTs. A pooled income fund is defined in I.R.C. § 642(c)(5). Additionally, 
there are statutory exceptions, including an exemption in section 170 for "a contribution of an undi-
vided portion of the taxpayer's entire interest in property ... " I.R.C. § 170(f)(3)(8)(ii). 
25. See I.R.C. § 170(f)(2)(A). 
26. See I.R.C. § 170(f)(2)(8). 
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puted without reference to that contingency;27 thus the non-charitable inter-
est will not be discounted to increase the charitable deduction. 
A eRA T is a trust in which not less than 5 percent and not more than 
50 percent of the initial contribution value of the trust must be paid annu-
ally, for no more than a twenty year fixed term or for life, to at least one 
individual who is not a charity;28 however, a CRA T must not pay any other 
amounts to anyone other than to a qualified charity29 and a CRA T may not 
receive additional contributions from anyone.30 Moreover, there are certain 
ordering rules for determining the character of CRT distributions made to 
the non-charitable beneficiaries that begin as the least tax favored)1 At the 
end of the specified term of the annuity, the remainder, valued at a mini-
mum of 10 percent of the value of the initial contribution to the trust,32 
must pass to a qualified charity.33 
By contrast, a CRUT is a trust that must pay at least annually a fixed 
percentage, rather than a fixed amount like the CRA T, of not less than 5 
percent and not more than 50 percent of the trust's asset value, determined 
yearly, for not more than twenty years or for life, to at least one individ-
uaP4 and must not pay anyone else, except a charity)5 Unlike with a 
CRAT, however, the CRUT instrument may allow for income payments in 
any year to be the lower of the trust's income or the above computed in-
27. 1.R.C. § 664(t)(I)-(2). A "qualified contingency" is "any provision of a trust which provides 
that, upon the happening of a contingency, the payments described in paragraph (I)(A) or (2)(A) of 
subsection (d) (as the case may be) will terminate not later than such payments would otherwise termi-
nate under the trust." 1.R.C. § 664(t)(3). 
28. 1.R.C. § 664(d)(I)(A). See H. R. REP. No. 91-413, pt. 2, 38-39 (1969). 
29. 1.R.C. § 664(d)(I)(8). 
30. Treas. Reg. § 1.664-2(b) (as amended in 200 I): 
A trust is not a charitable remainder annuity trust unless its governing instrument provides 
that no additional contributions may be made to the charitable remainder annuity trust after 
the initial contribution. For purposes of this section, all property passing to a charitable re-
mainder annuity trust by reason of death of the grantor shall be considered one contribution. 
This subsection of the regulation was adopted on August 23,1972. T.D. 7202 (1972). 
31. CRT distributions are first treated as taxable ordinary income to the extent of trust income and 
income undistributed in earlier years, second as capital gain likewise to the extent of trust capital gain 
and capital gain undistributed in earlier years, then as other income, and ultimately as the nontaxable 
return of capital. 1.R.C. § 664(b)( 1)-(4). The trust itself is not taxed on income, except for an excise tax 
applicable to unrelated business taxable income. I.R.C. § 664(c)(2). 
32. 1.R.C. § 664(d)(I)(D). The value of the remainder must be determined by the actuarial tables. 
See I.R.C. §7520. 
33. I.R.C. § 664(d)(I)(C). However, the remainder may also: 
be retained by the trust for such a [charitable] use or, to the extent the remainder interest is in 
qualified employer securities (as defined in subsection (g)( 4)), all or part of such securities are 
to be transferred to an employee stock ownership plan (as defined in section 4975(e)(7)) in a 
qualified gratuitous transfer (as defined by subsection (g)) ... 
Id.; see I.R.C. § 664(g). 
34. I.R.C. § 664(d)(2)(A). 
35. I.R.C. § 664(d)(2)(8). 
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come amount (a NICRUT)36 and may allow for the total of any excess 
fixed percentage amounts to be paid to the non-charitable beneficiary in 
later years (a NIMCRUT).37 The remainder requirements for a CRUT are 
the same as those for a CRAT38 and the value of the charitable contribution 
to either type of CRT is determined at the time of the creation of the trust 
by considering the yearly required distributions of 5 percent, or greater 
amount as required by the trust, of the value of the trust's assets.39 
B. The Policy Behind the 1969 Rules 
When the Treasury made recommendations for changes to be made to 
the split-interest charitable contribution provisions, it focused on ensuring 
that the charity's benefit matched the amount of the donor's charitable 
deduction: 
When property is transferred to a trust in which a charity has either an 
income or remainder interest, the contributor often receives a deduction 
for an amount considerably in excess of the amount that the charity ulti-
mately realizes. This occurs because the method for valuing the charita-
ble interest may have little relation to investment policy as regards 
income versus capital growth. 
The Treasury recommends that for gifts in this form the charitable de-
duction be allowed only under arrangements which guarantee that the 
charity will actually receive an amount equivalent to the amount for 
which the deduction is allowed.40 
Thus, the Treasury proposed that the income interest in the trust, 
whether it is a CRT or CLT, be either an annuity or a unitrust. The Treas-
ury liked the annuity form because at that time the Treasury believed that 
"the trustee would have no incentive to manipulate trust investments or 
misallocate deductions or receipts."41 Because with an annuity the trust 
would pay a fixed amount, comprised of income and, if insufficient, of 
principal, the Treasury thought that the trustee would inevitably apply 
"sound business judgment" to make the entire trust profitable "since neither 
interest could benefit from a different investment policy."42 Moreover, the 
Treasury explained that the unitrust form-a more flexible option that 
36. l.R.C. § 664(d)(3)(A). A NICRUT, or a NIOCRUT, is an acronym for a net income (only) 
charitable remainder unitrust. 
37. I.R.C. § 664(d)(3)(B). A NIMCRUT is an acronym for a net income with a makeup provision 
charitable remainder unitrust. 
38. l.R.C. § 664(d)(2)(C)-(D). 
39. I.R.C. § 664(e). 
40. 1969 TREASURY STUDIES AND PROPOSALS, supra note 2, at 21, as reprinted at § 170.31. 
41. !d. at 183, as reprinted at § 170.34. 
42. Id. Clearly, in retrospect, these judgments were naive. See infra Part IIl.C. 
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would likewise insure that the charity profit equally with the non-charitable 
interest-would allow the annuitant to increase the amount of the income 
she received, but that both parties would be entitled to the same increases 
due to "inflation or investment success. "43 
The House reiterated the essential policy rationale that a change was 
necessary because the current law did not require a match between the 
amounts of the charity's benefit and the charitable deduction. "This is be-
cause the trust assets may be invested in a manner so as to maximize the 
income interest with the result that there is little relation between the inter-
est assumptions used in calculating present values and the amount received 
by the charity."44 This policy underlined the motivation behind other split-
interest measures in the House bill, such as denying a charitable deduction 
for a gift of a contingent charitable remainder45 or of a charitable interest in 




43. 1969 TREASURY STUDIES AND PROPOSALS, supra note 2, at 184, as reprinted at § 170.35: 
In this situation all incentive for the trustee to invest the property for the benefit of either the 
income or the remaindermen to the detriment of whichever was the noncharitable interest 
would be removed. Such a trust would make it possible for the trustee to pursue either a 
growth-oriented investment policy or an income-oriented investment policy or some combi-
nation of both with the assurance that neither investment policy would benefit one party to the 
detriment of the other. 
44. H. R. REp. No. 91-413, supra note 7, at 58. 
For example, the trust corpus can be invested in high-income, high-risk assets. This enhances 
the value of the income interest but decreases the value of the charity's remainder interest. 
Your committee does not believe that a taxpayer should be allowed to obtain a charitable con-
tribution deduction for a gift of a remainder interest in trust to a charity which is substantially 
in excess of the amount the charity may ultimately receive. 
45. See, e.g., Gillespie v. Comm'r, 75 T.C. 374, 375-376 (1980), wherein, under the Tax Reform 
Act of 1969, the court denied a charitable deduction for decedent's testamentary trust whereby the 
church would only receive the remainder interest in a trust if decedent's son died before he received all 
of the payments at age 26 without leaving any children who survived to age 21. The court rejected the 
estate's arguments that the 1969 statute was unconstitutional as a "senseless restriction on testamentary 
giving," and that the decedent's son, an often institutionalized schizophrenic, was unlikely to have any 
children so that the church would probably get at least a part of the trust corpus. 
46. 1969 House Action, supra note 7, as reprinted at §§ 170.58-59. See, e.g., Hartford Nat'l Bank 
& Trust Co. v. United States, 467 F. 2d 782, 786 (2d Cir. 1972), wherein the decedent created a testa-
mentary trust for her daughter and her children, or the survivor, for life, remainder to two hospitals and 
a church and the trustee had the power to invade the principal of the trust for the "physical welfare" of 
the life beneficiaries. Under pre-1969 law, the court upheld a charitable deduction for the split-interest 
trust because, under former Treas. Reg. § 25.2522-2(a) (1958), inapplicable to decedents dying after 
1969, the power was "sufficiently objective under current doctrine to permit the charitable remainder 
interest to be presently ascertained." Hartford, 467 F.2d at 786. In addition, where an asset, such as a 
closely held interest or real estate, is difficult to value, qualification for the charitable deduction requires 
an independent trustee's sole valuation of the interest. H. R. REp. No. 91-413, supra note 7, at 60; see 
I.R.C. §§ 664(d)(I)(A) & (2)(A). 
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Regarding CL Ts in the income tax context, the House· decried the 
double tax benefit wherein a taxpayer not only received a deduction for his 
income interest, but also was untaxed on CL T income. "In fact, this double 
benefit allows a taxpayer to increase his aftertax cash position by postpon-
ing a planned noncharitable gift."47 The House described this benefit of a 
CL T as "an unwarranted tax advantage which it is not necessary to provide 
as an inducement to charitable giving."48 Finally, in order to erase even a 
partial undeserved earlier double income tax benefit, the House bill pro-
vided for the recapture of income tax deductions where a taxpayer, once 
taxable on trust income, was no longer subject to that liability.49 Likewise, 
besides proposing the recapture of any income tax charitable deduction in 
those circumstances, the House called for an equal recapture of the donor's 
gift tax charitable deduction. 50 
The Senate gave the same reasons for reforming CRTs and CLTs, 
however, because it considered restricting all charitable split-interest gifts 
to those forms as "unduly restrictive," as potentially having "a significant 
adverse effect on established forms of charitable giving," and as not adapt-
able to those two trust formats, the Senate recommended amending the 
House bill to continue to allow a deduction for certain types of split-interest 
gifts, like pooled income funds51 and a remainder interest in one's home.52 
In order to maintain the overall goal of the 1969 legislation that the donor's 
deduction equals the charity's benefit, the Senate amendment included a 
Id. 
47. H. R. REp. No. 91-413, supra note 7, at 61: 
For example, assume a taxpayer in the 70-percent bracket transferred property worth $100,000 currently earning interest at the rate of 5 percent to a trust for 2 years specifying that $5,000 be paid to charity each year, remainder to A. If the taxpayer had retained the property 
for 2 years he would have received $10,000 in interest taxable at 70 percent for an aftertax re-
turn of $3,000. On the other hand, by transferring the property to a trust he received a charita-
ble deduction of $9,498.50 (the present value of the charitable interest). The $10,000 received 
by the charity is not included in income and the deduction claimed reduces his tax on other 
income $6,648.95. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 61-62. 
This [recapture feature] is accomplished by treating the donor at the time he ceases to be tax-
able on the trust income as having received income to the extent the deduction he previously 
was allowed exceeds the value of the income previously earned by the trust and taxable to 
him. For this purpose, these amounts of income are to be discounted to their value at the time 
of the contribution to the trust. 
Id. at 62; 1969 House Action, supra note 7, at 39, as reprinted at § 170.59. 
50. H. R. REp. No. 91-413, supra note 7, at 62. 
51. S. REp. No. 91-552, supra note 4, at 87. The Senate, however, would impose on these conven-
tional split gifts "appropriate limitations, however, to prevent the overstating ofthe charitable contribu-
tion deduction." Id. 
52. Id. at 88-89. 
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method for valuing the charitable donations of property to a pooled income 
fund53 and of a non-trust gift of a remainder interest in real property. 54 
In order to give the donor "greater flexibility,"55 the Senate added the 
allowance of a payout of the lower of (1) the CRA T or CRUT net income 
or (2) 5 percent of the value of the trust assets. The Senate also proposed 
the allowance of a makeup provision in a year where the net income of a 
CRT later exceeds the percentage of asset value.56 The Senate believed the 
availability of these formats would thwart the destruction of the charity's 
remainder interest by eliminating the need for a trust to invade principal in 
a year with an unanticipated income shortage. 57 In addition, the Senate not 
only imposed a minimum annual required payout of the lower of trust in-
come or 5 percent of the net fair market value of trust assets, but also re-
quired the contribution's value to be based on the non-charitable income 
beneficiary annually receiving the higher of 5 percent of the net fair market 
value of the trust assets or the payout required by the trust instrument, con-
sequently reducing the value of the donor's charitable deduction in those 
instances.58 The Senate intended that the combination of the two require-
ments would eliminate the advantage that the CRT otherwise would have 
over private foundations that have current income distribution mandates. 
That is, without a payout requirement of current income, accumulated in-
come in the CRT would grow tax-free in the trust, a tax exempt entity.59 
Likewise, the Senate underlined that no other payments, besides the annu-
Id. 
53. Id. at 88. The Senate version provided that the charitable deduction would: 
be detennined by valuing the income interest on the basis of the highest rate of return earned 
by the particular pooled income fund in any of the three taxable years preceding the taxable 
year of the fund in which the transfer occurs. Where a fund has not been in existence for this 
period of time, the rate of return is to be assumed to be 6 percent, unless a different rate is 
prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate. 
54. Id. at 88-89. The Senate required that valuation of the real property would reflect appropriate 
straight-line depreciation and cost depletion and that the Treasury would apply a reasonable rate of 
return to value this split-interest "in view of the interest rates and investment returns prevailing at the 
time of the gift." Id. 
55. Id. at 90; Finance Comm. Press Release, supra note 5, as reprinted at § 170.63; See infra, note 
157. 
56. S. REp. No. 91-552, supra note 4, at 89 ("For purposes of this provision, the detennination of 
what constitutes trust income is to be made under the applicable local law and, thus, is not to include 
items such as capital gains which must be allocated to the trust principal."). 
Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 89-90. 
59. Id. at 90. However, the Senate clarified that a CRT would lose its tax exempt status: 
for any year in which the trust has income which would be unrelated business taxable income 
if the trust were an exempt organization subject to the unrelated business income tax. The 
committee does not believe that it is appropriate to allow the unrelated business income tax to 
be avoided by the use of a charitable remainder trust rather than a tax-exempt organization. 
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ity or fixed percentage amount, could be made to a non-charitable recipient 
from a CRA T or a CRUT60 and clarified a few other requirements of the 
charitable split-interest trustS.61 
The Senate agreed with the House that the double income tax benefit 
accorded CLTs was unjustified.62 However, the Senate considered that 
loophole confined to income taxes only and, therefore, modified the House 
bill so that the income tax deduction rule would not apply to either gift or 
estate taxes.63 Moreover, the Senate modified the House bill-and then-
current law-to allow a donor with a substantial reversionary interest in a 
CLT to obtain a charitable deduction where the income is taxed to him.64 
Further, while the House bill required all of the private foundation restric-
tions to apply to nonexempt charitable split-interest trusts in order to pre-
vent their use merely to avoid those rules,65 the Senate amended the blanket 
application of private foundation limitations to exempt CRTs and other 
split-interest trusts with small amounts of income benefiting a charity from 
the stock ownership and speculative investment requirements in certain 
instances.66 The Senate explained that the reason for applying those rules to 
private foundations, specifically "the problems of conflict of interest and 
Id. 
60. /d. 
61. For example, the Senate explained that: 
an annuity trust or a unitrust may have more than one noncharitable income beneficiary, ifthe 
interest of each such beneficiary either is for a term of years which does not exceed 20 years 
or is for the life of the beneficiary. An individual who is not living at the time of creation of 
the trust, however, may not be an income beneficiary of a charitable remainder trust. 
62. Id. at 92. 
63. /d. 
64. Id. 
65. /d. at 94. A nonexempt charitable trust is a trust that does not qualify for tax exempt status and 
therefore must pay tax on its taxable income. See I.R.C. § 4947(a)(I) (2006). 
66. S. REp. No. 91-552, supra note 4, at 94: 
Id. 
The committee amendments further provide, however, that the stock ownership and specula-
tive investment requirements imposed on private foundations are not to apply to split-interest 
trusts (A) in cases where charity is only an income beneficiary and the beneficial interest of 
charity in the trust is less than 60 percent of the value of the trust property and also (B) in 
cases where the only interest of charity in the trust is as a remainderman. In the latter case, the 
stock ownership and speculative investment requirements are to become applicable at the 
time the remainder interest of charity comes into possession. 
The bill also provides that a charitable contribution deduction (for income, gift, and estate tax 
purposes) is not to be allowed for a charitable interest in a nonexempt trust unless the trust in-
strument expressly prohibits the trust from violating the restrictions and requirements to 
which it is subject (such as, self-dealing, business holdings, etc.). 
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diversion of attention from the interests of charity" would not arise in the 
context of nonexempt charitable split-interest trustS.67 
Resolving the differences on charitable split-interests in the two 
houses, the Conference Report68 explained that while the Senate amend-
ments had been generally accepted, there were a few modifications: (1) a 
donation of a non-trust remainder interest in real property was to be valued 
at contemporaneous "money rates and investment returns";69 (2) the payout 
requirements that allow for distributions of the lesser of income or 5 per-
cent of the fair market value of the assets were to be restricted to CRUTs 
and inapplicable to CRA Ts, 70 with payment options not discretionary with 
the trustee;71 and (3) some different effective dates for the legislation,72 
II. DEFINITION OF CHARITABLE SPLIT-INTEREST TRUST 
A. First Definitions 
The Treasury Department's Studies and Proposals-which formed the 
impetus and substance for much of the 1969 legislation-incorporated 
temporal interests, such as a life estate and a remainder interest, in its defi-
nition of a charitable split-interest trust; thus, the Treasury described a 
split-interest trust as a trust containing either a charitable income interest 
and non-charitable remainder interest or a trust with a non-charitable in-
come interest and a charitable remainder interest. 73 The root of the abuse in 
such a trust was the "the investment policy as regards income versus capital 
growth," which emphasis would vary depending upon which interest had 
the non-charitable beneficiary. 74 This definition of a split-interest trust is 
67. "In these cases, the interest of charity in the trust property is not substantial enough in relation 
to the interests of the noncharitable beneficiaries to warrant the imposition of restrictions on the trust's 
investments." Id. 
68. H.R. REp. No. 91-782 (\969) (Conf. Rep.) reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391. 
69. Id. at 296. 
70. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text 
71. H.R. REp. No. 91-782, supra note 68, at 296. 
72. [d. at 296-297 ("The new rules are made applicable for income and gift tax purposes in the 
case of transfers in trusts and gifts after July 31,1969."). 
Id. 
73. 1969 TREASURY STUDIES AND PROPOSALS, supra note 2, at 21, as reprinted at § 170.31. 
74. Id. The Treasury had listed among its main concerns involving charitable deduction abuses: 
When property is transfe"ed to a trust in which a charity has either an income or remainder 
interest (emphasis added), the contributor often receives a deduction for an amount consid-
erably in excess of the amount that the charity ultimately realizes. This occurs because the 
method for valuing the charitable interest may have little relation to investment policy as re-
gards income versus capital growth. The Treasury recommends (emphasis in the original) that 
for gifts in this form the charitable deduction be allowed only under arrangements which 
guarantee that the charity will actually receive an amount equivalent to the amount for which 
the deduction is allowed. 
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repeatedly used in that report and the exploitation is identified as stemming 
from the split-interests being valued by using actuarial tables where the 
actual investment facts belie the assumptions of that valuation method.75 
Despite the language of the bill using the definition of the enacted 
statute, the House Report conformed to the Treasury Department's defini-
tion of a charitable split-interest trust as a trust with an income and a re-
mainder interest where the beneficiary of one of those interests was a 
charity and ofthe other was an individual: 
(7) Split-Interest Trusts-The Committee tentatively decided in the case 
of split-interest trusts (a trust under which the income is paid to provide 
persons and the remainder to charity, or vice versa) to adopt a provision 
under which the charitable contribution deduction would be recaptured 
in whole or in part where the investment policies of the trust-as be-
tween the income and the remainder beneficiaries-are not consistent 
with the assumptions on which the deduction was originally computed, 
and also to adopt a provision disallowing a charitable contribution de-
duction for a gift to charity in the form of an income interest in trust 
where the remainder is to go to a noncharitable beneficiary.76 
Likewise, in the Senate Report, charitable split-interest trusts are de-
fined: "[i]n the case of nonexempt charitable trusts which are split-interest 
trusts (i.e., trusts which have a noncharitable income beneficiary and a 
75. See. e.g., id. at 38, as reprinted at § 170.32: 
The charitable contribution deduction for a trust interest given to a charity is based on an as-
sumed actuarial calculation made at the time the trust is created. Management of the trust 
property, however, can be conducted with a view to favoring the interests of the non-
charitable beneficiaries and giving charity less than was assumed in calculating the deduction. 
The proposal would restrict the deduction to the amount that the charity actually receives. 
Id.; Id. at 182-183, as reprinted at § 170.34-35: 
When property is transferred to a trust in which the charity has either an income or remain-
der interest, the contributor often claims current income tax deductions whose magnitude has 
little relation to the value of the benefit which the charity ultimately realizes. The problem 
arises because of the need to value the charity's interest at the time the trust is created. The in-
terest is valued for these purposes by determining present values using actuarial life expec-
tancy tables and an assumed interest rate. The amount so determined is currently deductible 
even though the charity may not receive the property until a later date and the amount it could 
ultimately receive may be subject to various contingencies including the possibility of ma-
nipulation by the donor or others to enhance the noncharitable interest. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
76. H. R. Committee Decisions (Tentative~Press Releases, 7-8, as reprinted in 2 TAX MANAGE-
MENT-PRIMARY SOURCES (BNA) I, at § 170.48 (1970) (emphasis added). See H. R. REp. No. 91-413, 
supra note 7, at 58 (wherein the House clearly focused on a trust with a remainder interest: "General 
reasons for change.-The rules of present law for determining the amount of a charitable contribution 
deduction in the case of gifts of remainder interest in trust do not necessarily have any relation to the 
value of the benefit which the charity receives"). Likewise, in its explanation, the House report began: 
For the reasons discussed above, your committee's bill provides that a charitable contribution 
deduction (for income tax, gift tax, or estate tax purposes) is not to be allowed for a charitable 
gift of a remainder interest in trust where there is a non-charitable income beneficiary, unless 
the trust is either a charitable remainder annuity trust or a charitable remainder trust. 
Id. at 59. 
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charitable remainder beneficiary or vice versa}."77 Finally, in the summary 
of H.R. 13270, as prepared by the Joint Committee and the Finance Com-
mittee staffs, describing the then-current problems with charitable remain-
der trusts, that trust is defined as "a trust which provides that the income is 
to be paid to a noncharitable beneficiary for a period of time and the re-
mainder interest is to go to charity [and that] the House bill provides that if 
specified requirements are met, the trust is to be tax exempt."78 
B. Plain Language of the Statute 
While the definition described in the last section of this article might 
well describe the legislative intent. of the definition of charitable split-
interest, the enacted House bill included the following broader language-
which has virtually remained unchanged79-that defines a charitable split-
interest for estate tax purposes as: 
an interest in property (other than a remainder interest in a personal resi-
dence or farm or an undivided portion of the decedent's entire interest in 
property) [that] passes or has passed from the decedent to a person, or for 
a use, described in subsection (a) [i.e., a charitable use], and an interest 
(other than an interest which is extinguished upon the decedent's death) 
in the same property passes or has passed (for less than an adequate and 
full consideration in money or money's worth) from the decedent to a 
person, or for a use, not described in subsection (a) .... 80 
In 1969 the language identifying a charitable split interest for gift tax 
purposes was,81 and remains,82 similarly framed as a trust with any charita-
77. S. REp. No. 91-552, supra note 4, at 94 (emphasis added). 
78. STAFFS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION AND THE COMMITTEE 
ON FINANCE, SUMMARY OF H.R. 13270, THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969 (AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES), 91sT CONGo 1ST SESS. 36 (Comm. Print 1969). 
79. I.R.C. § 2055(e)(2) (2006) currently reads: 
Where an interest in property (other than an interest described in section I70(/)(3)(B)) passes 
or has passed from the decedent to a person, or for a use, described in subsection (a), and an 
interest (other than an interest which is extinguished upon the decedent's death) in the same 
property passes or has passed (for less than an adequate and full consideration in money or 
money's worth) from the decedent to a person, or for a use, not described in subsection (a), no 
deduction shall be allowed under this section for the interest which passes or has passed to the 
person, or for the use, described in subsection (a) unless [the interest is in the form of a chari-
table remainder annuity trust, a charitable remainder unitrust, a pooled income fund, a chari-
table lead annuity trust, or a charitable lead unitrust.] 
(emphasis added to indicate the only language changed from the 1969 legislation). 
I.R.c. § 170(£)(3)(8) provides that: 
Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to---
(i) a contribution of a remainder interest in a personal residence or farm, 
(ii) a contribution of an undivided portion of the taxpayer's entire interest in property, and 
(iii) a qualified conservation contribution. 
80. Tax Reform Act of 1969, supra note 3, § 201(d)(1), 83 Stat. at 560 (codified at I.R.C. 
§ 2055(e)(2». 
81. The 1969 provision read: 
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ble interest and any non-charitable interest. The income tax charitable de-
duction statute encompassed, then and now, virtually any property interest 
transferred to a trust, wherein the grantor is taxed on the income under the 
grantor trust rules.83 Gone from the language of any of the charitable split-
interest statutes is any clear reference to those disparate interests being 
successive temporal interests like a life estate and a remainder interest, 
which must be valued actuarially. In their place, the enacted statute encom-
passes many more trusts, some of which do not provide opportunities for 
abuse. 
C. Regulations 
F or decedents after 1969, the estate tax regulation basically restates 
the definition of a charitable split-interest in the same language as the stat-
ute.84 There are, however, two additions. First, in describing the non-
charitable part of the split-interest that the decedent created, the regulation 
adds the following parenthetical: "an interest (other than an interest which 
is extinguished upon the decedent's death) in the same property passes or 
has passed from the decedent for private purposes .... "85 Since an interest 
that terminates on a decedent's death is not taxed to his estate, this addition 
is not very significant. Second, in determining the phrase "passes or has 
passed from the decedent," the regulation provides that, at decedent's 
death, if the non-charitable interest depends on "the performance of some 
Where a donor transfers an interest in property (other than a remainder interest in a personal 
residence or farm or an undivided portion of the decedent's entire interest in property) to a 
person, or for a use, described in subsection (a) or (b) [i.e., a charitable use] and an interest in 
the same property is retained by the donor, or is transferred or has been transferred (for less 
than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth) from the donor to a per-
son, or for a use, not described in subsection (a) or (b) .... 
Id. at § 201 (d)(3), 83 Stat. at 561 (codified at I.R.C. § 2522(c)(2)). 
82. The current code section provides: 
Where a donor transfers an interest in property (other than an interest described in section 
170(t)(3)(8)) to a person, or for a use, described in subsection (a) or (b) and an interest in the 
same property is retained by the donor, or is transferred or has been transferred (for less than 
an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth) from the donor to a person, or 
for a use, not described in subsection (a) or (b) .... 
I.R.C. § 2522(c)(2) (2006). See supra note 81. 
83. The code provides that: 
No deduction shall be allowed under this section for the value of any interest in property 
(other than a remainder interest) transferred in trust unless the interest is in the form of a 
guaranteed annuity or the trust instrument specifies that the interest is a fixed percentage dis-
tributed yearly of the fair market value of the trust property (to be determined yearly) and the 
grantor is treated as the owner of such interest for purposes of applying section 671. 
I.R.C. § 170(t)(2)(8). The current provision is exactly the same as the one enacted in 1969. See Tax 
Reform Act of 1969, supra note 3, § 201 (a)(I)(8), 83 Stat. at 556 (codified at I.R.C. § 170 (t)(2)(8)). 
84. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(e)(I)(i) (as amended in 2003). 
85. Id. (emphasis added). 
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act or the happening of a precedent event in order that it might become 
effective, an interest in property will be considered to pass for a private 
purpose unless the possibility of occurrence of such act or event is so re-
mote as to be negligible."86 The regulation illustrates this latter interpreta-
tion in the following example: 
H bequeaths the residue of his estate in trust for the benefit of A and a 
charity. An annuity of $5,000 a year is to be paid to charity for 20 years. 
Upon termination of the 20-year term the corpus is to be distributed to A 
if living. However, if A should die during the 20-year term, the corpus is 
to be distributed to charity upon termination of the term. An interest in 
the residue of the estate has passed from H for charitable purposes. In 
addition, an interest in the residue of the estate has passed from H for 
private purposes, unless the possibility that A will survive the 20-year 
term is so remote as to be negligible.87 
The regulations88 explain the distinction between a charitable split-
interest and a charitable donation of an undivided portion of the decedent's 
entire property interest, which does not need to be in the statutory pre-
scribed formats. For the decedent to transfer an undivided portion of his 
entire property interest he must leave the charity a fraction or percentage of 
each of his substantial interests in the property and that gift must exist dur-
ing the entire term of his property interest. 89 The regulations specify that if 
the decedent had transferred a life estate in property to his wife while re-
taining a reversionary interest and then transferred one-half of his rever-
sionary interest in that property to a charity at his death, that charitable 
transfer is not a deductible one.90 However, if he had only ever owned a 
life estate in property (instead of once having owned all of the interests in 
the property), he could transfer that partial interest to a charity and qualify 
for a deduction.91 
86. Id. While generally contingent interests are will disqualify a split-interest trust, the statute 
allows certain "qualified contingencies." I.R.C. § 664(£)(1). Those particular contingencies provide that 
on an event occurring, the income payments in a CRT "will terminate not later than such payments 
would otherwise terminate under the trust." I.R.C. § 664(£)(3). See also note 21 and accompanying text. 
87. Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(e)(\)(i), Ex. 4. 
88. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170A-7(b)(I) (as amended in 1999), 20.2055-2(e)(2)(i), & 25.2522(c)-
3(b)(\) (\958). 
89. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.170A-7(b)(I), 20.2055-2(e)(2)(i), & 25.2522(c}-3(b)(I). 
90. The current regulation states: 
For example, if the decedent transferred a life estate in an office building to his wife for her 
life and retained a reversionary interest in the office building, the devise by the decedent of 
one-half of that reversionary interest to charity while his wife is still alive will not be consid-
ered the transfer of a deductible interest; because an interest in the same property has already 
passed from the decedent for private purposes, the reversionary interest will not be considered 
the decedent's entire interest in the property. 
Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-2(e)(2)(I). 
91. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-7(a)(2)(i). 
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D. Case Law 
To determine the deductibility of a charitable split-interest, the rules 
obviate a facts and circumstances analysis in favor of statutorily prescribed 
formats. 92 Under the plain meaning of the statute, when a charitable split-
interest in trust, is not established in one of the prescribed formats such as a 
CRT or CLT, the taxpayer receives no deduction for his gift to charity.93 
Moreover, not only must the trust instrument satisfy certain requirements, 
the trust must actually make its mandatory payments.94 When a taxpayer 
creates a trust that provides for a remainder interest to pass to a charity and 
she transfers property to that trust, she receives several tax benefits in addi-
tion to those accorded taxpayers who make an outright cash donation: (1) 
she does not have to pay income tax on the property's appreciation either 
before or after the transfer and (2) she receives a current charitable deduc-
tion for a gift that does not benefit the charity until a later date.95 
Although for the most part strictly applying the plain language of the 
statute, some courts have allowed a deduction when there is an event that 
intervenes to convert the defective charitable interest into an outright chari-
table donation.96 These cases reject the government's attempts to distin-
guish between a surviving spouse's right to take her elective share and an 
intestate heir's right to institute a will contest that ultimately results in a 
different disposition of the decedent's property than that found in the 
92. See Estate of Edgar v. Comm'r, 74 T.c. 983, 987-988 (1980), wherein the court rejected the 
taxpayer's argument that factually the trust produced sufficient income for the non-charitable benefici-
aries so that there would be little chance of invading the trust principal, stating that "permitting eco-
nomic factors to be considered would directly contradict Congress' intent to establish specific rules in 
this areal,] ... such an interest must in all events conform to the statutory requirements." 
93. See, e.g., Galloway v. United States, 492 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2007); Estate of 10hnson v. United 
States, 941 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1991); Edgar, 74 T.C. 983. 
94. See Estate of Atkinson v. Comm'r, 309 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2002) Although the CRAT 
was required to make annuity payments to the decedent during her life, the facts showed "that the estate 
produced no copies of these ( supposedly sent] checks or the cover letters that supposedly accompanied 
the checks to Atkinson, nor did the annuity trust's ledger reflect any outgoing annuity payments to 
Atkinson during her lifetime." Id. at 1292. Referring to the Tax Court opinion, the Eleventh Circuit 
explained that the payout requirement "ensures that the trust does not accumulate untaxed wealth for 
charities, which would sidestep the income distribution requirements of private foundations." !d. at 
1294. 
95. The court in Atkinson stated that: 
(i]n exchange for the significant benefits of allowing a present charitable deduction, even 
when the actual charitable donation is not to occur until the remainder interest in the property 
becomes possessory, and in allowing the assets of the trust to grow tax-free, the Code requires 
adherence to the CRA T rules. 
See id. at 1296. 
96. Estate of lackson v. United States, 408 F. Supp.2d 209,211 (N.D. W. Va. 2005) (allowing a 
charitable deduction for a cash settlement amount under 2055( e), which had resulted when a disqualify-
ing charitable split-interest trust was terminated as part of a will contest). 
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Will.97 To some degree, however, those cases rely on the pre-1969 "ascer-
tainable interest" test that "the non-charitable beneficiaries' interests were 
then capable of being measured and severed from the charitable prop-
erty."98 
The distinction between a surviving spouse's right to take her elective 
share and an intestate heir's right to institute a will contest, however, re-
flects the different results in two prominent income tax cases: Lucas v. 
Ear/99 and Poe v. Seaborn.loo The rationale for the different outcomes in 
those cases, where a married couple tried to split-the husband's income as 
earned or owned one-half by each spouse, is that in Lucas the court saw the 
couple's agreement to assign income as a voluntary act occurring after the 
property interest in the income vested in the earner-husband whereas in 
Seaborn Washington's community property laws controlled so that, from 
the instant the husband earned income, each spouse owned one-half of the 
aggregate income amount. IOI Certainly, a spouse's elective share right is a 
property interest like in Seaborn, but by contrast, an heir's right to contest a 
will merely gives him a cause of action against the decedent's estate-it 
does not guarantee him a property interest in decedent's estate. Indeed, the 
settlement of a will contest is a voluntary agreement incorporating the par-
ties' assessment of multiple and varied factors. 
Taxpayers have argued that some of the flawed charitable split-interest 
trusts constituted "undivided interests" under the regulations and that they 
therefore met the criteria for a deduction.102 With some of those cases, like 
Johnson, that argument clearly lacked merit. In Johnson, the estate con-
tended that there were essentially three separate trusts because the dece-
dent's trust had three objectives: (1) to support his sisters, (2) to oversee 
family graves, and (3) to provide for the education of religious persons in 
the Catholic Church.103 But, those three purposes did not reflect one-third 
interests in the entire trust. The will "unambiguously designate[d] the crea-
97. See Flanagan v. United States, 810 F.2d 930, 934 (10th Cir. 1987); First Nat'l Bank of Fa-
yetteville, Arkansas v. United States, 727 F. 2d 741 (8th Cir. 1984); Oetting v. United States, 712 F.2d 
358 (8th Cir. 1983). However, courts have properly not allowed this result where a defective charitable 
split-interest trust was terminated solely to obtain a charitable deduction. See Burdick v. Comm'r, 979 
F.2d 1369, 1372 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that under Pennsylvania law, because there was no will con-
test or reason for the settlement other than to skirt the law and to obtain relief by a means not specifi-
cally permitted under § 2055(e)(3), the estate was not entitled to a charitable deduction). 
98. First Nat '/ Bank of Fayetteville, 727 F.2d at 747. 
99. 281 U.S. III, 114-15 (1930). 
100. 282 U.S. 101, 117 (1930). 
101. See Lucas, 281 U.S. at 114-15; Seaborn, 282 U.S. at 117. 
102. See, e.g., Galloway v. United States, 492 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2007); Estate of Johnson v. United 
States, 941 F.2d 1318 (5th Cir. 1991); Zabel v. United States, 995 F.Supp. 1036 (D. Neb. 1998). 
103. Johnson, 941 F .2d at 1318. 
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tion of one trust to serve three separate purposes, only one of which in-
volve[d] a charitable bequest."104 With three competing interests, the chari-
table interest was not an undivided one under the definition in the 
regulations. I 05 
Zabel is another case that although correctly decided under the plain 
meaning of the statute, might be viewed as a charitable gift of an undivided 
half interest in the entire trust. Here, the decedent had created a trust pass-
ing a 50 percent income interest and a I 00 percent remainder interest to 
two charities. 106 The plaintiff contended that: "[a]s to that 50% portion, the 
charities occupy all of the space. They get all of the income from inception, 
all of the principal. It is not a split-interest."107 However, the court rejected 
that argument as well and stated that the charities did not receive the same 
degree of protection that they would under the statutorily required formats 
and posed the example of the trustees investing all the trust assets into junk 
bonds so that the income beneficiaries would benefit to the possible disad-
vantage of the charity, which held I 00 percent of the remainder. 108 The 
court held that this was a charitable split-interest trust, that it was not in one 
of the three prescribed forms for split-interest trusts, and that it was not 
reformed according to rules of the statute. 
Finally, although the decedent literally created a defective charitable 
split interest trust, Galloway is a case where none of the interests had to be 
valued by means of the actuarial tables. In Galloway, the decedent had left 
104. Id. at 1320. 
105. Id. at 1321. 
106. 
During the life of said testamentary trust, said Trustee shall prudently invest the trust assets 
and at end of each calendar quarter pay over all net trust income remaining after trust ex-
penses on the following basis: (I) Twenty (20) percent to my nephew, Lee 0. Gillespie, now 
of Charlotte, North Carolina, for a period of 21 years or until his death, whichever comes 
first; (2) Thirty (30) percent to my great niece, Elaine Gillespie, for a period of 21 years or 
until her death, whichever comes first; (3) Twenty-five (25) percent to the Trinity United 
Methodist Church of Lincoln. Nebraska for a period of time equal of the life of the Trust; (4) 
Twenty-five (25) percent to the Nebraska Masonic Home located in Plattsmouth. Nebraska, 
for the period of time equal to the life of the Trust; and (5) In the event of the death of either 
Lee O. Gillespie or Elaine Gillespie prior to the expiration of twenty-one years after my 
death, their income share shall be divided on a prorata basis among the remaining income 
beneficiaries for the remaining life of the Trust; (b) After the death of both the said Lee O. 
Gillespie and Elaine Gillespie, OR the expiration of 21 years from the date of my death, 
whichever event occurs first; the Trust shall be terminated and all net trust funds then remain-
ing on hand, both principal and income, after final trust expenses, shall be distributed to the 
following two charitable beneficiaries: One-Half share of the distributable trust assets to: The 
Trinity United Methodist Church of Lincoln, Nebraska; and One-Half share of the distribut-
able trust assets to: The Nebraska Masonic Home, situated in Plattsmouth, Nebraska .... 
Zabel, 995 F.Supp. at \039. 
107. Id. at 1044-1045. 
108. Id. at 1047-1048. Except for "standards of prudence," the trust instrument did not prevent this 
action. 
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his property in trust to two charitable beneficiaries and to two non-
charitable beneficiaries, which under the plain meaning of the statute meant 
that they had to be in one of the prescribed statutory forms, which conced-
edly they were not. Under the terms of the trust, half of the value of the 
trust was to be distributed on January 1,2006, one-fourth to each benefici-
ary, and the remaining assets in the trust were to be distributed the same 
way ten years later. 109 The circuit court acknowledged that the denial of 
deduction in this case, although the proper result under current law, was 
"unfortunate" since there was little opportunity for abuse. "Each benefici-
ary of the Trust, charitable and non-charitable, shares equally in the risk of 
loss and the benefit of good investing as each beneficiary receives an equal 
share in the property." I 10 
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE CHARITABLE SPLIT-INTEREST RULES 
A. Complexity 
A testament to the complexity of the 1969 legislation was the contin-
ual extension for document reformations in multiple pieces of tax legisla-
tion. 111 The series of continual requests for extensions occurred despite that 
109. Galloway v. United States, 492 F.3d 219,220 (3d Cir. 2007). Moreover, the trust also pro-
vided that if an individual is not alive at the distribution date(s), "his or her share will be distributed to 
the remaining beneficiaries in equal parts." Id. 
110. Id. at 224. 
III. The Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201,83 Stat. 487, 526, 549, generally 
applied to decedents dying after 1969; however, there was a transition rule for a trust created after July 
31, 1969 if the governing instrument was amended to satisfy the new requirements by December 31, 
1972. See H.R. REp. No. 93-1405 at 3 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 33372, 
33372. The Act of Oct. 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-483, § 3,88 Stat. 1457, adding I.R.c. § 2055(e)(3), 
provided that: 
In the case ofa will executed before September 21,1974, or a trust created before such date, 
if a deduction is not allowable at the time of the decedent's death because of a failure of an in-
terest in property which passes from the decedent to a person, or for a use described in sub-
section (a), to meet the requirements of subparagraph (A) of paragraph (2) of this subsection, 
and if the governing instrument is amended or conformed on or before December 31, 1975, 
or, if later, on or before the 30th day after the date on which judicial proceedings begun on or 
before December 31, 1975 (which are required to amend or conform the governing instru-
ment), become final, so that the interest is in a trust which is a charitable remainder annuity 
trust, a charitable remainder unitrust (described in section 664), or a pooled income fund (de-
scribed in section 642(c)(5», a deduction shall nevertheless be allowed. 
This amendment applied to estates of decedent's dying after 1969. Id. § 3,88 Stat. at 1458. The Tax 
Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1304, 90 Stat. 1520, 1715-16 (amending Section 
2055(e)(3» provided "(I) by striking out 'September 21, 1974.' and inserting in lieu thereof 'December 
31, 1977.' and (2) by striking out 'December 31, 1975' each place it appears and inserting in lieu 
thereof 'December 31, 1977. '" In addition, the Act extended the period for filing a claim for a refund of 
estate tax paid allowable under section 2055(e)(3), providing that such a claim "shall not be denied 
because of the expiration of the time for filing such a claim under section 651 I (a) if such claim is filed 
not later than June 30, 1978." § 1300(b), 90 Stat. at 1716. These amendments "shall apply in the case of 
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in the interim the Treasury and Congress expressed their belief either that 
an extension was unnecessary or that there would be no further delays. 
Specifically, the first postponement to allow reformations until the end of 
1974 was coupled with expressions from the Treasury that there had al-
ready been sufficient time for settlors to reform their trusts l12 and it was 
not alone in that opinion. l13 The additional extension through the end of 
decedents dying after December 31,1969." § 1304(c), 90 Stat. at 1716. The Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. 
L. No. 95-600, § 514, 92 Stat. 2763, 2883-84, amended Section 2055(e)(3) to read: 
In the case ofa will executed before December 31,1977, or a trust created before such date, if 
a deduction is not allowable at the time of the decedent's death because of the failure of an in-
terest in property which passes from the decedent to a person, or for a use, described in sub-
section (a) to meet the requirements of subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (2) of this 
subsection, and if the governing instrument is amended or conformed on or before December 
31, 1978, or, if later, on or before the 30th day after the date on which judicial proceedings 
begun on or before December 31, 1978 (which are required to amend or conform the govern-
ing instrument), become final, so that interest is in a trust which meets the requirements of 
such subparagraph (a) or (B) (as the case may be), a deduction shall nevertheless be allowed. 
Also, "in the case of trusts created before December 31, 1977," the applicable estate and gift tax provi-
sions were likewise conformed. § 514(b), 92 Stat. at 2884. The Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, 
Pub. L. No. 96-605, § 301,94 Stat. 3521,3530, amended section 2055(e)(3) to read: "(I) by striking out 
'December 31, 1977' and inserting in lieu thereof 'December 31, 1978'; and (2) by striking out 'De-
cember 31, 1978' each place it appears and inserting in lieu thereof 'December 31, 1981'." See H.R. 
REp. No. 98-432, pt. 2, at 1516 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.s.C.C.A.N. 697, 1155-56 ("Congress first 
permitted reformation of charitable remainder trusts in 1974 and since that time, the Congress has 
extended the period for reformations several times and extended the procedure to other types of split-
interest charitable contributions. "). 
112. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 93RD CONG., DESCRIPTION OF 
TECHNICAL AND MINOR BILLS LISTED FOR A HEARING BY THE COMMITIEE ON WAYS AND MEANS ON 
DECEMBER 10, 1975 48 (Comm. Print 1975), as reprinted in 4 TAX MANAGEMENT-PRIMARY 
SOURCES (BNA) II at § 2055 (1977): 
The Treasury Department believes that transitional rules must come to an end sometime and 
notes that 6 years have passed since the enactment of the charitable remainder trust rules. 
However, it would not object to a one year extension if it is made clear that further extensions 
will not be granted. 
113. See, e.g., Estate of Gillespie v. Comm'r, 75 T.C. 374,380 (1980) stating: 
Moreover, had the petitioner desired to obtain an estate tax charitable deduction, albeit at the 
expense of losing the trust's flexibility, the trustee could have applied to the Oregon State 
courts to reform the trust so as to qualify it under section 2055(e)(2). See sec. 2055(e)(3) and 
the regulations thereunder. 
Id.; see also Estate of Sorenson v. Comm'r, 72 T.C. 1180, 1188,1191 (1972). In response to the estate's 
contention that "the time limitations of section 201 (g)( 4)(B) [of the Tax Reform Act of 1969] should 
not apply to property which is considered a bequest of a decedent as long as the will creating the power 
met those limitations," the court held that: 
[t]he effective date provision, section 201 (g)(4)(B) of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, moderated 
the harshness of the deduction disallowance clause. Congress surely anticipated that if a per-
son chose not to modify existing arrangements otherwise subject to section 2055(e)(2), then 
such person's estate would suffer the consequences of that decision. Here, decedent had 4 
years (from December 30, 1969, the effective date of section 201(g)(4)(B)(ii) of the Tax Re-
form Act of 1969, to January 24, 1974, date of death) to exercise her power of appointment 
and to place the assets in a trust qualifying for a charitable deduction. It was entirely dece-
dent's choice to forego her opportunity to exercise her power of appointment .... Thus, the 
new rules of section 2055(e) are applicable to decedent. 
[d. at 1188, 1191 (emphasis added). Although Sorenson refers to the effective date of the 1969 Act 
extension, rather than a liberal period for reformation, the point the court made is essentially the same. 
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1977, which again was deemed "the last extension pennitted," was tied to 
allowing the government to have a campaign to update the public on the 
new requirements for split-interest trusts'! 14 In 1978, Senator Bumper in-
troduced a floor amendment to the Revenue Act of 1978 in order to delay 
the refonnation provisions for one additional year through 1978 to amend 
CRT and CLT instruments for income, estate, and gift tax purposes; spe-
cifically, he wanted to aid Arkansas College, which had received a large 
bequest after 1977.115 In 1980, because Congress found "a number ofmeri-
torious cases" that would result in charities having to pay estate taxes if 
trust instruments were not refonned, Congress wanted a two-year extension 
through the end of 1980; additionally, Congress understood "that the 
Treasury is studying the possibility of proposing a pennanent rule on this 
issue."116 
In 1984, Congress pennanently amended the split-interest provisions 
to allow taxpayers a limited post-death ability to comply with the strict 
rules. I 17 
[I]t has come to the attention of the committee that there are still many instru-
ments providing for split-interest charitable contributions which do not meet the 
requirements for qualification under the rules of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 .... 
In light of the repeated need to extend the period to reform such governing in-
struments and the fact that failure to meet the 1969 Act rules often results in re-
114. H.R. REP. No. 94-1268, at 3 (1976): 
While your committee has concluded that an additional extension of two years is appropriate 
at this time under the circumstances, your committee believes that this should be the last ex-
tension permitted by Congress. By the end of this extension, there will have been eight years 
since the general effective date of the new requirements for deduction under section 2055(e) 
of the Code. Your committee believes that such an eight-year period should be more than 
enough time for taxpayers and their lawyers to learn the new rules and to implement them in 
their estate planning. 
Also, your committee intends that the Internal Revenue Service make every effort to publicize 
to taxpayers' attorneys, trust companies, etc., the requirements of the 1969 Act with respect to 
charitable remainder trusts. Your committee solicits the assistance of commercial tax services 
to similarly publicizing these requirements. 
Id.; S. REP. No. 94-938, pt. I, at 600-01 (1976), reprinted at 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3438,4024-25; see 
also STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX 
REFORM ACT OF 1976, 397-98 (Comm. Print 1976). Because that extension was limited to CRTs for 
estate tax purposes only, in 1977, Congress enacted an extension through December 31, 1977 for both 
CRTs and CLTs for income and gift taxes and to CLTs for estate taxes. See H. R. REP. No. 95-700, at 
88 (1977); S. REp. No. 95-745, at 103 (1977). 
liS. Revenue Act of 1978 at § 514, 92 Stat. at 2884; see STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, 95TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE ACT OF 1978, 292-93 (Comm. 
Print 1979). According to Senator Dale Bumpers (D. Ark.), the college received a very large gift but 
needed the legislation to be extended to the end of 1978 to allow the school to reform the charitable 
bequest and, thereby, to save itself $40,000 in estate tax costs. 124 CONGo REc. 34,383 (Oct. 6, 1978) 
(statement of Sen. Bumpers). 
116. H.R. REp. No. 96-2178, at 44 (1980). 
117. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1022, 98 Stat. 494 (amending I.R.C. 
§§ 170(f). 664(f), 2055(e), and 2522(c)). 
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duced amounts passing to charity, the Committee believes that a permanent rule 
permitting reformation of split-interest charitable contributions should be permit-
ted so long as there are adequate safeguards to avoid abuse. I 18 
871 
Immediately prior to the 1984 Act, the law allowed for the refonna-
tion of some charitable split-interest trusts that were created before the end 
of 1978;119 with the new law, certain refonnations are available cur-
rent1y,l20 forty years after the enactment of the 1969 legislation. In addi-
tion, the government has published sample split-interest trust forms since 
1989.121 However, even with all of this help, there continue to be instances 
where wealthy taxpayers and venerable charities cannot adhere to the chari-
table split-interest rules despite the availability of government guidance and 
the statute's very generous reformation provision. 122 Thus, while split-
118. H.R. REp. No. 98-432, pt. 2, at 1516 (\984) reprinted in, 1984 V.S.C.C.A.N. 697, 1156. 
Congress feared that allowing the reformation of trusts without restrictions would invite taxpayers to 
create abusive trusts that would conform to the statutory format only if, and when, audited. 
119. The Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-605, § 301, 94 Stat. 3521, 3530, 
amended the then-current version of the extension of section 2055(e)(3), which provided for the allow-
ance of trust instrument reformations in the case of a will executed before December 31, 1977, or a trust 
created before such date "( I) by striking out 'December 31, 1977' and inserting in lieu thereof' Decem-
ber 1,1978'." 
120. See H.R. REp. No. 98-861, at 1242 (\984) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1445, 
1930 stating: 
The House bill provides a permanent rule permitting reformation of charitable split-interest 
trusts if certain requirements are satisfied. Under this provision of the House bill, the relative 
values of the charity and the noncharity interests in the trust may not vary by more than 5 per-
cent as a result of the reformation. Additionally, unless the reformation proceedings are begun 
within 90 days after the due date of the Federal estate tax return (or the first trust income tax 
return if no estate return is due), the trust must, as executed, provide for an annuity trust or 
unitrust amount. 
Id. Under section 2055, to be a "qualified reformable interest," either all payments must be expressed as 
specific dollar amounts or a fixed percentage of the fair market value of the trust property, I.R.C. 
§ 2055(e)(3)(C)(ii) (2006), or a judicial proceeding must be initiated by "the 90th day after ... the last 
date (including extensions) for filing [the estate tax] return." § 2055(e)(3)(C)(iii)(J). 
121. The government has published samples in order to obviate the need for private ruling requests 
for taxpayers who adopt the use of its forms. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 07-46, 2007-29 I.R.B. at \02; Rev. 
Proc. 07-45, 2007-29 I.R.B. at 89; Rev. Proc. 05-59, 2005-34 I.R.B. at 412; Rev. Proc. 05-58, 2005-34 
I.R.B. at 402; Rev. Proc. 05-57, 2005-34 I.R.B. at 392; Rev. Proc. 05-56, 2005-34 I.R.B. at 383; Rev. 
Proc. 05-55, 2005-34 I.R.B. at 367; Richard L. Fox, A Guide to the IRA Sample Charitable Remainder 
Trust Forms, 33 N.Y. EST. PLAN. 13, 13-14 (Jan. 2006) (criticizing some aspects of the government 
forms and suggesting some alternatives). 
122. See, e.g., Estate of Tamulis v. Corum'r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2006-183, 2-7 (2006), wherein dece-
dent, a Catholic priest, had created a testamentary trust with a life estate in real property to his brother 
and sister-in-law, or the survivor, with the trust paying the real estate taxes on that property during their 
lives, and certain fixed annual amounts, with some of them conditional bequests, with any remaining 
net income each year to go equally to two grandnieces. At the end of the longer of \0 years or his 
brother and sister-in-Iaw's joint lives, the remainder of the assets was to go to the Roman Catholic 
Diocese of Fall River, Massachusetts. The estate stipulated that the trust did not qualifY for a charitable 
deduction at the time of the decedent's death because it failed to comply with the statutory requirements 
of section 2055(e); however, it made several arguments that the remainder interest was "a reformable 
interest" that was reformed as required by section 2055(e)(3). The court, however, rejected that conten-
tion because the payments for real estate taxes for the non-charitable beneficiaries and payments of the 
remaining net income to non-charitable beneficiaries were not expressed either as a fixed dollar amount 
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interest trusts continue to be popular with the wealthy, 123 they are evidently 
too complex or problematic for some donors or charities. 124 
B. Overly Inclusive Definition? 
The original definition of a charitable split-interest trust, which ap-
pears in the preliminary 1969 Tax Reform Act material,125 as well as the 
rationale for the 1969 legislationl26 clearly envisions a much more limited 
definition of that term than the language adopted in the 1969 statute with-
out comment. 127 That is, the Treasury and the House report definition com-
prehended successive temporal property interests in trust that rely on 
actuarial valuation, such as income and remainder interests. There is an 
array of case law in which the courts refer to the unfortunate result of non-
compliance with the statutory mandates for charitable split-interest trusts 
wherein they plainly pertain. 128 A particularly severe result is the outcome 
in Galloway where the charitable and non-charitable beneficiaries share the 
same fate regardless of the trust investments. 129 
or as a fixed percentage of the fair market value of the property as required by the reformation statute. 
Consequently, the only available route for reformation was beginning a judicial reformation proceeding 
within 90 days of the estate tax return's due date; no such proceeding was ever instituted. The court 
rejected the estate's claims that a return statement constituted an amendment of the trust or a com-
mencement of a judicial proceeding and the court held that, although the trustee administered the trust 
as if it were a qualified unitrust, the estate had not shown that it was entitled to have the doctrine of 
substantial compliance apply.ld. at 21-23. 
123. Lisa Schreiber, Split-Interest Trusts, Filing Year 2007, I.R.S. STAT. OF INCOME BULL. at 46 
(Winter 2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0 .. id=204956.00.html (for 2007, 
"[e]nd-of-year net asset values reported for split-interest trusts increased to $115.4 billion .... In 2007, 
some 115,754 returns for charitable remainder trusts were submitted, a decrease of 0.3 percent .... 
Trustees for charitable lead trusts submitted 6,377 returns in 2007, an increase of 1.3 percent over 2006 
filings"); I.R.S. News Release, I.R.S. Issues Winter 2009 Statistics Of Income Bulletin, IR-2009-17 
(Mar. 3, 2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0 .. id=204956.00.html( .. Split-interest 
trusts reported $12.2 billion in total net income in filing year 2007, an increase of 22.1 percent since 
2006. Total accumulations, including ordinary income, short-term and long-term capital gains, and 
nontaxable income, also increased, from $66.3 billion in filing year 2006 to $73.1 billion in 2007."). 
124. See Estate of Gillespie v. Comm'r, 75 T.C. 374, 379 (1980) ("[Section 2055(e)(2)] certainly 
adds substantial complexity to an area already complex."). 
125. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text. 
126. See Valerie H. Kuntz, Galloway, Split-Interest Trusts, and Undivided Portions: Does Disal-
lowing the Charitable Contribution Deduction Overstep Legislative Intent? 20 REGENT U. L. REv. 125 
(2007); see also supra Part LB. 
127. See supra Part LA. 
128. See. e.g., Galloway v. United States, 492 F.3d 219, 224 (3d Cir. 2007) (granting that the result 
in the case was "unfortunate" because there was little opportunity for abuse. "Each beneficiary of the 
Trust, charitable and non-charitable, shares equally in the risk of loss and the benefit of good investing 
as each beneficiary receives an equal share in the property."); Estate of Gillespie v. Comm'r, 75 T.C. 
355,379 (1980) (acknowledging that "the application of section 2055(e)(2) may result in some unfair-
ness"). 
129. See Galloway, 492 F.3d at 224. 
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On the other hand, Congress has clearly embraced this definition. 
When it enacted the permanent reformation provision in 1984, the legisla-
tive history no longer referred to successive actuarially determined inter-
ests; rather it denoted a trust that contained any combination of charitable 
and non-charitable beneficial interests. Thus, the 1984 House report defines 
a charitable split-interest in trust as a trust which is "part charitable and part 
non-charitable."130 In addition, the courts have explained how the statute's 
broad compass prevents additional abuse. 131 
C. CRTs and CLTs: Unanticipated Tax Abuse 
By only focusing on matching the amount of the taxpayer's donation 
to the amount received by the charity132 and by not anticipating certain 
excessive tax benefits flowing to the donor, a CRT and, most especially, a 
CL T provide the donor with an "unwarranted tax advantage which is not a 
necessary inducement to charitable giving."\33 A CRT allows the donor to 
avoid income taxes by timing the donor's deduction before the actual chari-
table gift,134 and overvalues the charitable deduction by undervaluing the 
non-charitable interest,135 a NICRUT and a NIMCRUT serve as uninten-
tional and gratuitous retirement saving and deferral devices,136 and a CL T 
130. H.R. REp. No. 98-432, pt. 2, at 1516 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 697,1155 (under 
the rules adopted by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, a charitable interest in a split-interest trust is a trust 
which is part charitable and part noncharitable); see H.R. REp. No. 98-861, at 1242 (1984) (Conf. Rep.), 
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1445, 1930 ("Trusts having both charities and noncharities as benefici-
aries generally must be structured as unitrusts or annuity trusts to qualify for a charitable deduction."). 
131. See, e.g., Zabel v. United States, 995 F. Supp. 1036,1047-48 (D. Neb. 1998), where the court 
explained, despite the plaintiff's argument that the charities would not be harmed, "the trust instrument 
does not provide the charities with the same level of protection that section 2055( e )(2)(A) requires." 
The court then gave the example ofa trustee's investing in junk bonds to produce a large income return, 
but where ultimately the remainder might be worthless. Id. at 1048. Under the facts in Zabel, where the 
charities owned fifty percent of the income interest and 100 percent of the remainder and the non-
charitable beneficiaries owned the remaining fifty percent of the income interest, with such an invest-
ment, the charities' interests in this trust would be less protected than under the statutory format. Id. 
Likewise, in Atkinson the CRA T required annuity payments, which were not in fact paid to the annui-
tant, to prevent the accumulation of untaxed wealth, thereby bypassing the income distribution require-
ments applied to private foundations. Estate of Atkinson v. Comm'r, 309 F.3d 1290, 1294-96 (11th Cir. 
2002). 
132. See supra note 40. 
133. In 1969, Congress used this language to criticize the then benefit of a CL T, i.e., a double 
income tax benefit of allowing a charitable deduction for amounts already not included in the taxpayer's 
income. See H.R. REp. No. 91-413, supra note 7, at 61; supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text. 
134. Atkinson, 309 F.3d at 1296. 
135. The non-charitable interest is valued using the life expectancies of the average person whereas 
the life expectancies of the wealthy are actually longer than for the average person. See infra note 140. 
136. The types of CRT primarily used as a retirement format are the popular NICRUT, see I.R.C. 
§ 664(d)(3) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.664-3(a)(I)(i)(b)(l) (as amended 2004), and NIMCRUT, see Treas. 
Reg. § 1.664-3(a)(l)(i)(b)(l) (as amended 2004). 
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allows a settlor to avoid transfer taxes on gifts to non-charitable beneficiar-
ies.I 37 
Much of the unintended tax benefits from these charitable split-
interest trusts stem from the inherent flaws of valuing an interest by means 
of the actuarial tables l38 at the time of the creation of the trust. The tables 
are touted for their simplicity, historical acceptance, and universal applica-
tion, but not for their accuracy or their ability to predict future investment 
outcomes in any particular case. 139 That is, the tables only truly match the 
partial interest in property's actual value in the "average" case. Because it 
is the taxpayer who chooses the format in which to make his charitable gift, 
he can plan to use the actuarial tables, although theoretically neutral, only 
when that choice is more likely to serve his advantage. 
A CRT provides additional benefits to the taxpayer and other family 
members who are life beneficiaries in the trust since the wealthy, for a 
number of reasons, live longer than the general public on whose lives the 
actuarial tables are based. 140 They therefore are likely to receive more total 
annuity or unitrust payments than are reflected in the value of that interest 
as that interest is calculated by means of the tables. Thus, the non-
charitable income interest in a CRT is likely to be undervalued while the 
charitable remainder interest is correspondingly overvalued. 
137. At the tennination of a CLT, all trust asset appreciation passes to non-charitable beneficiaries 
transfer tax-free. In addition, with a CLAT, all income that exceeds the required annuity payouts passes 
to those individuals without any additional transfer taxes. 
138. Annuities and other partial interests in property, such as remainders, must be valued by the 
actuarial tables. l.R.C. § 7520 (2006). Even before that statute's enactment in 1988, Technical and 
Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. 1. No. 100-647, § 503 I (a) (1988), the regulations dealing 
with estate and gift tax valuation indicated their usage. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(c) (as amended 
2000), which indicates the applicable regulation and tables for valuing interests in decedent's estate 
from before Jan. I, 1952 to the present date, and I.R.C. § 25.2512-5A(a) for parallel valuation instruc-
tions for gift tax purposes. 
139. The required use of the actuarial tables indicates "[t]he intention of the lawmakers ... that the 
computation of the tax should be made ... on the basis of a law of averages." Sinclair Ref. Co. v. 
Jenkins Petroleum Process Co., 289 U.S. 689, 698 (1933); see Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 
U.S.151, 155 (1929) (Congress had mandated that decedent's wife's life interest had to be computed by 
the actuarial tables at the time of decedent's death in 1921); Wendy C. Gerzog, Annuity Tables Versus 
Factually Based Estate Tax Valuation: Ithaca Trust Re-visited, 38 (ABA) REAL PROP., PROB., & TRADE 
J. 745, 755 (2004). 
140. See BARRY JOHNSON & JENNY WAHL, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN'S WELL-BEING: REFINING 
REALIZED INCOME MEASURES WITH WEALTH, PORTFOLIO, AND MORTALITY INFORMATION 4 (2004), 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soil04johnta.pdf: 
To compensate for the age bias and produce estimates more representative of the living popu-
lation, we re-weight the file using reciprocals of mortality rates (by age and sex), adjusted by 
a differential that reflects the lower mortality rates experienced by the wealthy. Richer people 
tend to live longer because they enjoy access to better healthcare. safer occupations. and su-
perior nutrition. 
(emphasis added). 
2010] REFORMING THE CHARITABLE SPLIT-INTEREST RULES (AGAIN) 875 
Some of the main benefits of a CRT, moreover, are the income tax 
benefits that include (1) an immediate charitable deduction for a transfer 
that the charity can only enjoy some time in the future; 141 (2) avoiding 
capital gains on sales of trust assets so that the untaxed proceeds from those 
sales can produce more income; 142 and (3) the ability to defer tax until 
income is needed some time in the future.I 43 In that last role, a CRT, gen-
erally a NICRUT OR NIMCRUT, is often used as an optimal retirement 
vehicle; 144 that is, not subject to the contribution limitations currently im-
posed on the various government retirement accounts, which exist primar-
ily for a retirement purpose, a CRT can invest in low or no-income 
products for years when income is not currently desired and make up for 
the lack of earlier payments when the donor turns 65 or 70, for example. 145 
While the Senate proposed the net income and net income with 
makeup provision CRT for both the CRAT and the CRUT, the Conference 
report restricted these forms to a CRUT, thus creating the NICRUT and 
NIMCRUT versions of a CRUT.146 The Senate stated that the purpose for 
these flexible formats was to prevent a shortfall of the required income 
payment and thus to protect the charity's remainder interest. The potential 
141. See Ron Shoemaker & David Jones, K. Charitable Remainder Trusts: The Income Deferral 
Abuse and Other Issues, 1997 EO CPE Text 13.24 at 141 (1997), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utlltopic-k.pdf. 
142. The donor of a CRT is not taxed on capital gains since they adhere to the charity, a tax-exempt 
entity. Often, the donor contributes appreciated real property or other illiquid assets to the CRT to avoid 
capital gain taxes and to enable her to receive higher income payments once the property is sold and can 
be re-invested. See KATHRYN G. HENKEL, ESTATE PLANNING AND WEALTH PRESERVATION: 
STRATEGIES AND SOLUTIONS ~33.01 (Warren, Gorham & Lamont RIA, abridged student ed. 2003). 
143. See Shoemaker & Jones, supra note 141, at 140 stating: 
IRC 664(d)(3) was enacted to give trustees breathing room. If, in any year, trust income 
dropped and the distributions to the noncharitable beneficiaries originally intended by the do-
nor could not be met using trust income, the trustees could temporarily reduce the current 
payout, or could otherwise adjust the unitrust's portfolio to generate sufficient income for fu-
ture years. 
However, the net income and makeup provisions of IRC 664 are now being used not to gain 
flexibility in the normal management of the portfolio, but for a tax deferral purpose not con-
templated by Congress. 
To achieve a maximum deferral for a noncharitable beneficiary, a trust's assets must be ma-
nipulated in such a manner so that the net income and makeup provisions can be used to avoid 
payout in the early years of the trust and to realize income, including the makeup amount, 
only in later years when the noncharitable income beneficiary may be in a lower tax bracket. 
This device is called an income deferral NIMCRUT. 
144. Besides the NICRUT OR NIMCRUT, which are both statutory devices, the regulations sanc-
tion the one time flip CRUT, which begins as a NICRUT OR NIMCRUT and, on a triggering event, 
such as birth, marriage, divorce, death, or sale of an unmarketable asset, see Treas. Reg. § 1.664-
3(a)(I)(i)(d) (as amended 2000), the trust "flips" to an ordinary CRUT. See Treas. Reg. § 1.664-
3(a)(l)(i)(e), Ex.5. These rules are effective for CRTs established on or after December 10, 1998. See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.664-3(a)(l)(i)(t). 
145. Those plans include, inter alia, the traditional IRA, sections 401(k), 403(e), and 457(b) plans 
that have contribution and other limitations. 
146. See supra notes 56-57, 70 and accompanying text. 
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need for an invasion of principal in a year when trust income is insufficient, 
however, would more likely occur with a CRAT, which requires an income 
payout of the same required fixed annuity amount than with a CRUT, 
which has an income payout of an amount that varies as a fixed percentage 
of each year's trust asset value. 147 Inexplicably, the NICRUT and 
NIMCRUT options do not require the trustee to invest in a way aimed to 
meet the required income payout amounts. 
By contrast, the CLT is chiefly well-liked by the very wealthy as the 
family cannot access trust assets during the term of the trust, during which 
time this device provides annual payments to a charity. Very popular with 
most universities,148 almost all major charities from the Red Crossl49 to 
PETAI50 promote their use. Essentially, by using a CLT instead of making 
a direct gift of a remainder interest in property to family members without 
incorporating a charitable donation, when the property actually grows or 
earns more than the assumptions incorporated in the actuarial tables more 
value passes to those non-charitable beneficiaries transfer-tax free. 151 
147. That is, while income varies with actual interest rates from year to year and so the CRUT as 
well as the CRA T can have an income underperformance, the asset value also varies from year to year, 
but only the CRUT, and not the CRAT, takes that factor into account. 
148. See, e.g., Gift Planning Tools at BYU Marriott School, 
http://marriottschool.byu.eduigiving/c\t.cfm(lastvisitedJan.11 , 20 I 0); Duke University Gift Planning, 
http://giving.duke.eduigiftplanning/giftplans/charitableleadtrusts/(lastvisitedJan.11 , 2010). 
149. See Gift Planning at Redcross.org, http://www.redcrosslegacy.org/GIFTcharitlead.php (last 
visited Jan. 11, 20 I 0) which extols the following benefits of a CL T: 
You qualify for a gift tax deduction for the present value of the annuity payments to the Red 
Cross. The annuity payments and the term of the trust can be specified in such a way so as to 
reduce or even eliminate the transfer taxes due when the principal reverts' to your heirs. All 
appreciation that takes place in the trust goes tax-free to your heirs. You can use your avail-
able estate tax credit to further reduce taxes on transfers to your heirs. You can have the satis-
faction of making a significant gift to the Red Cross now that reduces the taxes due on 
transfers to your heirs later. 
150. Planned Giving at Peta.org, http://www.peta.org/jnew/leadtrusts.asp (last visited Jan. 11, 
2010) ("The value of the nongrantor trust is that it can help you to transfer assets to loved ones, gener-
ally children or grandchildren, at a reduced cost while providing significant support to PETA's pro-
grams.") 
151. See Outside the Box on Estate Tax Reform: Reviewing Ideas to SimplifY Planning: Hearing 
Before the Comm. on Finance, I 10th Congo 2, at 6 (2008) (statement of Diana Aviv, President and CEO 
Independent Sector), available at http://www.senate.gov/-finance/hearings/ testi-
mony/2008testl040308datest.pdf. For example: 
Dad transfers $1,000,000 in property to a CLAT with a ten year charitable term and an eight 
percent payout rate. The property earns ten percent (after-tax) yearly, and the [I.R.C. §l 7520 
rate at the time of the transfer is eight percent. The remainder interest is valued at $463,192 at 
the time of the transfer. At the end of the charitable term, the value transferred to Dad's chil-
dren is $1,318,748.49. Had Dad initially made a gift of property worth $463,192 rather than 
creating the CLA T, the gifted property would be worth $1,201,400.76 at the end of ten years, 
assuming it grew at ten percent (after-tax) each year. 
HENKEL, supra note 142, at ~ 35.09. Of course, with either a CL T or CRT, there is a risk that the asset 
may not perform as well as expected; however, that risk is tipped in favor of the taxpayer since it is he 
who decides whether to create such a device and what property he will use to fund the trust. 
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Moreover, the charitable gift and the gift to family members can be "zeroed 
out," so that the taxpayer can transfer property to her family for little or no 
taxes. 152 
The benefit of a CL T is transfer tax avoidance regarding the remainder 
interest that ultimately passes to the donor's beneficiaries. Like with a 
CRT, the assumptions incorporated in the actuarial tables may in them-
selves create that benefit. The actuarial tables assume a fixed rate of growth 
based on current interest rates, which at any time but particularly when 
interest rates are low, are unlikely to be accurate over a fixed term of 20 
years, for instance. When, as now, interest rates are historically low, the 
charitable deduction for a CLATI53 is larger.154 Moreover, the donor 
chooses the property she will transfer to the CLT; that property grows tax-
free in the trust; and it is likely that the actuarial value of the remainder will 
not match and underestimate, for transfer tax purposes, the present value of 
the amount that the family members will ultimately receive. That difference 
produces an underestimation and an understatement of transfer taxes and, 
consequently, an unintentional tax loophole, which Congress did not an-
ticipate when it amended the CLT provisions in 1969.155 
IV. SOLUTIONS 
A. Simplicity 
The charitable split-interest rules are not simple; however, Congress 
has provided for a reform provision and the government has published 
sample forms, which comply with the statute. Congress could certainly 
simplify the charitable trust provisions, but most of the simple solutions are 
ones that would be unacceptable to the taxpayer because they would defeat 
her ability to receive additional tax advantages beyond the benefit of a 
charitable deduction. 
The simplest-and fairest rule-and the one least susceptible to ma-
nipulation would be the requirement that, to receive any charitable deduc-
tion, all donations be in cash.156 That rule would remove valuation 
152. Where the value of the income interest qualifying for the gift tax charitable deduction equals 
the value of the remainder interest that passes to the non-charitable recipient, the gift is "zeroed out." 
153. "If the CLT property is expected to appreciate, a CLAT is usually the better choice, since the 
annuity remains fixed and more property can go to the family beneficiaries." HENKEL, supra note 142, 
at'll 35.08. 
154. See id. at '1135.01 [3][a] ("The value of an annuity varies inversely with interest rates, so a 
lower interest rate will produce a higher charitable deduction, all other factors being equal."). 
155. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying discussion. 
156. That requirement would eliminate the tax driven charitable split-interest trusts with their 
complexities and costs. Simply, a donor or an executor should be required to selI alI assets that are to be 
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difficulties and the necessity for the use of the actuarial tables, with their 
inherent inaccuracy, susceptibility to manipulation, and indefensible reve-
nue loss. In 1969, there were voices for the end to the unwarranted tax 
breaks accruing only to the rich 157 by requiring cash contributions just as 
there are today. ISS If all deductible donations had to be made in cash, the 
charitable gifts of the wealthy would be in the same medium as those of the 
poor. However, for most taxpayers, this proposal would resemble one from 
Jonathan Swift.159 Yet, there is some good common sense (applicable then 
and now), as well as a comeuppance, in the words of the elder Senator Al-
bert Gore: 
The donor of appreciated property is clearly $25 ahead of his counterpart who 
gave out of his income. Colleges and universities, during the Finance Committee 
hearings, strongly objected to introducing tax equity into the treatment of chari-
table gifts by taxing in any manner appreciation on capital assets. The distressing 
feature of the stance adopted by colleges and universities was that they did not 
address themselves to the issue of tax fairness. Their representatives simply as-
serted that because they were the beneficiaries of an unfair tax system, that sys-
tem should not be changed. This is precisely the argument made by the oil 
companies for percentage depletion.l6o 
donated in order to receive a charitable deduction. More than merely resolving the problem of com-
plexities with regard to charitable split-interest trusts, Congress would be able to eliminate almost all of 
the complicated limitations on charitable gifts. For example, you would eliminate the need for the 
Section 170(b) percentage limitations, the Section 170( e) required contribution value reductions, and 
the Section 170(f) split-interest rules since the abuse protection embodied in a mandatory cash require-
ment charitable deduction law would make them superfluous. Moreover, this solution satisfies all of the 
purported goals of a tax system: equity, neutrality, and simplicity. These goals are also sometimes 
referred to as "fairness, efficiency, and administrability." See generally I U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, TAX 
REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH-GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
TREASURY DEPARTMENT PROPOSALS 13-19 (Nov. 1984). 
157. S. REp. No. 91-552, supra note 4, at 334-35 (individual views of Sen. Albert Gore): 
From the standpoint of tax justice, there is no basis for the present treatment of charitable gifts 
of appreciated property. Tax reform must ultimately encompass the full taxation of apprecia-
tion on property given to charity. Only in this way can gifts of property and gifts out of in-
come, which most citizens make, be treated equally .... There is no rational reason why the 
Government should subsidize the two gifts in a different amount. 
158. See, e.g., George K. Yin, JCT Chief Discusses the Tax Gap, 107 TAX NOTES 1449, 1450 
(2005): 
Many taxpayers, in effect, are provided with the equivalent of a deduction equal to much 
more than 100 cents for each dollar of property value given to charity .... Finally, contrast 
further the incentive given to cash gifts by taxpayers who do not itemize. They are allowed a 
deduction equal to zero cents for each dollar given-no tax inducement at all. Now add one 
additional fact-which I think is beyond dispute-that cash gifts are less susceptible to non-
compliance than are gifts of property with uncertain values, and we see a rather odd outcome. 
159. JONATHAN SWIFT, A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR PREVENTING THE CHILDREN OF POOR PEOPLE 
IN IRELAND FROM BEING A BURDEN TO THEIR PARENTS OR COUNTRY, AND FOR MAKING THEM 
BENEFICIAL TO THE PUBLIC (1729) (suggesting that they would be served up for dinner: "I have been 
assured by a very knowing American of my acquaintance in London, that a young healthy child well 
nursed is at a year old a most delicious, nourishing, and wholesome food, whether stewed, roasted, 
baked, or boiled; and I make no doubt that it will equally serve in a fricassee or a ragout."). 
160. S. REp. No. 91-552, supra note 4, at 335 (individual views of Sen. Albert Gore). Put another 
way by Representative Wilbur Mills in 1969: 
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Because of their inherent abuse potential, it would be difficult to sim-
plify the rules of a charitable split-interest trust. Simplicity combined with 
equity would dictate removing the split-interest. 
B. Definition of a "Split-Interest" 
The current definition works well in most instances. While some 
cases, like Zabel161 and Tamulis,162 may seem harsh, where Zabel could 
have been divided into two trusts, and Tamulis had relatively minor non-
charitable interests that could have been provided for in another way,163 
nevertheless, they both could have been subject to at least some of the ma-
nipulation Congress tried to prevent in the 1969 Act. 164 Moreover, regard-
less of whether the plain statutory definition of charitable split-interest 
embodies the original Congressional intent,165 Congress clearly has em-
braced that definition, most notably in its major reformation of the split-
interest rules in 1984.166 
Therefore, while the statutory definition of a charitable split-interest is 
broader than the original one, its over-inclusiveness harms few donors. 
However, if Congress were to contemplate changing that definition, that 
modification should be limited to including an exception for a case like 
Galioway,167 wherein 100% of each interest, whether charitable or non-
charitable, is treated equally throughout the term of the trust and where 
there can be no manipulation advantaging the non-charitable interest at the 
expense of the charitable interest. Thus, the current definition of charitable 
split-interest might accordingly be modified to include an exemption from 
If ever there is a loophole in the law, it is in this business of being able to give property that 
has appreciated tremendously in value. It is possible to get a tax break and save money under 
the tax law, doing it all under the guise of charity. This is a part of the bill with which I do not 
agree completely. But we backed off of it, I guess because the people running the museums 
said, "If you do not let them donate property and receive a tax deduction, they will sell the 
property for the benefit of Europeans and we will be deprived of the opportunity to see it." 
liS CONGo REc. 40,872 (Dec. 22,1969) (statement of Rep. Mills). 
161. See supra notes 106-108 and accompanying text. 
162. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
163. From the estate tax return describing a CRUT, there is no reason why the estate did not reform 
the trust as allowed by the statute. But, in terms of the decedent's estate plan, as one example, he could 
have created a small trust (if he could not have been persuaded to make outright gifts to his family) to 
cover the conditional gifts and the expense allowance for costs associated with his brother's and sister-
in-law's anticipated real estate liabilities. Since the decedent wanted almost all of his estate to benefit 
the Catholic diocese, he could have passed most of his estate to it in an outright gift. 
164. See supra note 131. In Tamulis, while the trust may well in fact have been operated as a 
CRUT, there was no assurance that it would continue to conform to those rules because the governing 
instruments did not require the trustee to follow the CRUT requirements. See supra note 122. 
165. See supra Parts I.B, II.B. 
166. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
167. See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text. 
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the charitable split-interest rules: "where the value of any interest in the 
trust does not need to be determined by the use of the actuarial tables and 
where there is no abuse potential in valuing either the charitable or non-
charitable interests. "168 With this modification, the charitable split-interest 
rules would allow a deduction for trusts like in Galloway that lack income 
and remainder interests and share proportionately in the trust's investment 
outcomes. 169 
C. Curtailing the Abuse in Charitable Split-Interest Trusts 
This article proposes two ways to limit the income tax deferral inher-
ent in a CRT. One, instead of allowing an income tax charitable deduction 
when the donor establishes a CRT, the statute should time the charitable 
deduction with the charity's receipt when the remainder vests.1 70 Two, the 
ability to defer income tax is also a consequence of the statutory enact-
ments of the NICRUT and the NIMCRUT and the regulatory allowance of 
a "flip" trust, which converts one of the two CRUT variations into an ordi-
nary CRUT at some triggering event. l7l These variations of a CRUT 
should be eliminated. 
The other major reform that Congress should undertake is to change 
the CL T rules. In 1969, Congress focused on matching the amount of the 
charitable donation to the amount the charity received. Today, Congress 
needs to focus on the match between the value of the property transferred 
168. Regarding the statutory refonnation provisions, Congress could increase the time period to 
more than 90 days (such as six months), but since the legislation is forty years old and the I.R.S. pub-
lishes sample fonns, there's really little excuse for noncompliance; also, Congress' stated policy of not 
allowing trusts to remain defective until the I.R.S. audits them would likely be contravened with such 
an extension of time. See supra Part lILA. 
169. See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text. Note that in Galloway, the charities received 
fifty percent of the trust assets and the non-charitable beneficiaries received the other fifty percent. If, 
however, the trust were to benefit those interests disproportionally, such as an 80-20 split favoring the 
non-charitable beneficiaries, the trust would not qualify under this exception. (An alternative view 
would minimally require that the value of the charitable minority interest, and deduction, be dis-
counted.) 
170. That refonn will consequently provide a matching between the amount of the taxpayer's 
deduction and the benefit to the charity because it will all be happening in real time. In 1969, the Treas-
ury stated that "[t]he charitable contribution deduction for a trust interest given to a charity is based on 
an assumed actuarial calculation made at the time the trust is created .... The proposal would restrict 
the deduction to the amount that the charity actually receives." 1969 TREASURY STUDIES AND 
PROPOSALS, supra note 2, at 38, as reprinted at § 170.32. No longer dependent upon actuarial esti-
mates, this refonn will ensure that desired result. "The problem [i.e., the lack of correlation between the 
donor's deduction and the charity's benefit] arises because of the need to value the charity's interest at 
the time the trust is created. The interest is valued for these purposes by determining present values 
using actuarial life expectancy tables and an assumed interest rate." Id. 
171. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
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to the non-charitable beneficiary and the amount that is subject to transfer 
tax. 172 
While a CL T that outperforms the assumptions of the actuarial tables 
is allowed to increase the benefits accruing to the non-charitable beneficiar-
ies without additional transfer taxes, there is no remedy for a CL T that 
underperforms the tables; while the donor has the disadvantage that he 
would consequentially have with any bad investment, that donor has al-
ready received a tax benefit for amounts not received by the charity. Be-
cause there is no "recovery" and because transfer taxes are not income 
taxes, which are payable annually, the tax benefit rule l73 is inapplicable to 
transfer taxes. The absence of a remedy is especially problematic with re-
spect to a testamentary CL T. 
Additional recommendations to reform the CL T rules center on cor-
recting the flaws of actuarial valuation in this context: (I) a recapture pro-
vision; (2) a requirement that the CLT investment be a U.S. Treasury debt 
instrument; or (3) a requirement that the initial valuation of the charitable 
deduction be discounted to reflect investment marketability and risk al-
lowed in the trust instrument. That is, Congress should adopt a recapture 
provision 174 when the remainder vests in the non-charitable beneficiary to 
172. See supra notes 148-153 and accompanying text. In 1969, the Treasury did not anticipate this 
side of the equation. "The fact that in addition to producing income the trust principal may appreciate or 
depreciate in value is irrelevant." 1969 TREASURY STUDIES AND PROPOSALS, supra note 2, at 192, as 
reprinted at § 170.37. Likewise, the Treasury stated: 
If the annuity format is used-irrespective of whether the charity has the annuity or remainder 
interest-the trustee would have no incentive to manipulate trust investments or misallocate 
deductions or receipts. In all events either income, or to the extent necessary, principal would 
be used to pay the annuity and sound business judgment would dictate that the trustee invest 
the property in the most profitable manner possible since neither interest could benefit from a 
different investment policy. 
Id. at 183, as reprinted at § 170.34. 
173. See I.R.C. § III (2006); Hillsboro Nat'l 8ank v. Comm'r, 460 U.S. 370, 372 (1983). 
174. Note that the 1969 legislation adopted a recapture provision for the income tax deductions 
where a grantor trust loses that status and thus is not taxed on the income. Section 170(f)(2)(8) pro-
vides: 
If the donor ceases to be treated as the owner of such an interest for purposes of applying sec-
tion 671, at the time the donor ceases to be so treated, the donor shall for purposes of this 
chapter be considered as having received an amount of income equal to the amount of any 
deduction he received under this section for the contribution reduced by the discounted value 
of all amounts of income earned by the trust and taxable to him before the time at which he 
ceases to be treated as the owner of the interest. Such amounts of income shall be discounted 
to the date of the contribution. 
I.R.c. § 170(f)(2)(8) (2006). 
As explained in the Joint Committee's Explanation of the 1969 Act: 
The Act provides a special rule where under the rules set forth above the taxpayer is allowed a 
charitable deduction for income tax purposes for an income interest transferred in trust to 
charity but subsequently for any reason ceases to be taxable on the trust income. In this case 
under the general rule, the grantor would receive a double tax benefit with respect to the fu-
ture trust income-he would not be taxed on that income but would have received a charitable 
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adjust for any prior overvaluation of the charitable interest deduction and 
any undervaluation of the transfer taxes imposed on the non-charitable 
interest. Alternatively, Congress should require the tax effects to occur only 
when actual transfers take place (either to the charity or the non-charitable 
beneficiary). Focusing on the investment of a CLT in order to eliminate or 
substantially reduce transfer tax abuse, Congress should require a CL T to 
hold only specific types of investments, such as U.S. Treasury debt instru-
ments, that have predictable outcomes. Alternatively, Congress should 
heavily discount the value of the charitable gift depending on the types of 
investment allowed under the trust instrument, thereby increasing the value 
of the non-charitable interest. 
CONCLUSION 
How should the charitable deduction split-interest rules be reformed 
(again)? The current defmition of charitable split-interest should exempt 
from the charitable split-interest rules a trust "where the value of any inter-
est in the trust does not need to be determined by the use of the actuarial 
tables and where there is no abuse potential in valuing either the charita-
ble or non-charitable interests. " In addition, Congress should repeal the 
statutory provision allowing the NICRUT and the NIMCRUT forms of a 
CRUT, because while the intention of those devices was to preserve the 
charitable remainder interest, they are routinely used to provide taxpayers 
with the income deferral associated with retirement accounts while avoid-
ing the congressionally approved limitations and requirements of those 
options. Finally, Congress should modify the CLT rules either (1) to restrict 
investment options to provide for more predictable outcomes that will pre-
vent transfer tax avoidance or (2) when the remainder interest becomes 
possessory, to subject the non-charitable remainder interest to additional 
transfer taxation to reflect any disproportionate appreciation or mcome 
production accruing only to the non-charitable beneficiary. 
deduction with respect to it. To prevent this result, the Act provides for the recapture of that 
part of the charitable contribution deduction previously received by the taxpayer with respect 
to the income of the trust which will go to the charity but on which he will not be taxed. This 
is accomplished by treating the donor at the time he ceases to be taxable on the trust income 
as having received income to the extent the deduction he previously was allowed exceeds the 
value of the income previously earned by the trust and taxable to him. For this purpose, these 
amounts of income are discounted to their value at the time of the contribution to the trust. 
JOINT COMMITIEE EXPLANATION, supra note 5, at 88. 
